Edith Cowan University

Research Online
ECU Publications Pre. 2011
1990

Issues facing and shaping the role of district superintendents
during a period of radical change
Rod Chadbourne

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ecuworks
Part of the Education Commons
Chadbourne, R. (1990). Issues facing and shaping the role of district superintendents during a period of radical
change. Churchlands, Australia: Western Australian College of Advanced Education.
This Report is posted at Research Online.
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ecuworks/7026

Edith Cowan University
Copyright Warning
You may print or download ONE copy of this document for the purpose
of your own research or study.
The University does not authorize you to copy, communicate or
otherwise make available electronically to any other person any
copyright material contained on this site.
You are reminded of the following:
 Copyright owners are entitled to take legal action against persons
who infringe their copyright.
 A reproduction of material that is protected by copyright may be a
copyright infringement. Where the reproduction of such material is
done without attribution of authorship, with false attribution of
authorship or the authorship is treated in a derogatory manner,
this may be a breach of the author’s moral rights contained in Part
IX of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth).
 Courts have the power to impose a wide range of civil and criminal
sanctions for infringement of copyright, infringement of moral
rights and other offences under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth).
Higher penalties may apply, and higher damages may be awarded,
for offences and infringements involving the conversion of material
into digital or electronic form.

ISSUES FACING AND SHAPING THE ROLE
OF DISTRICT SUPERINTENDENTS
DURING A PERIOD OF RADICAL CHANGE

Rod Chadbourne
Principal Researcher

~~
0
~

c.oWAN UN!t;,e,

~

2 6 APR 1991

The International Institute for
Policy and Administrative Studies
School of Education
Western Australian College
of Advanced Education

1990

I

/

~

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER

Page

1.

Introduction

1

2.

A Two Tier System

6

3.

The Centre Tier:

Separating Operations From Policy

23

4.

The School Tier:

Differences That Cause Difficulties

37

5.

Conflict Between the Tiers

58

6.

The Superintendent's Power in Relation to Principals

68

7.

Concluding Remarks

83

8.

Dissenting Responses

86

BIBLIOGRAPHY

106

I

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

"If you ask us to define the role of the district
superintendent you'll get 29 different versions."
"Superintendents were like the Jews in the wilderness wandering forty days and nights with no idea where they
were going and no defined role."
"We have a problem. The role of the superintendent has
not yet been identified and there are current practices
which significantly prevent the role being adequately
explored. So we fly by the seat of our pants."
"Our role is shaped by what happens in the field, not in
principle from Central Office."
"We've been waiting for the Executive to reveal the grand
plan, the end product, what the final product looks like
because we're confused. Now we realise they don't know
what the end will look like, they haven't got a grand
plan."
(District Superintendents, March-April, 1990)

Before 1987, the work of superintendents was well known throughout the
state education system.

Their role had evolved over a long period of time

and was firmly established - materially and in the minds of school staff.
Sometimes people disagreed with how that role was discharged but they did
have a clear idea of what it entailed.
profile.

Superintendents also enjoyed a high

They were commonly seen to occupy powerful and prestigious

positions, presiding over teachers' careers and curriculum developments.
The Better Schools Report changed much of that.
After 1987, the superintendents became fewer in number and lower in
profile.
mode.

They were reduced from around 75 to 29 and placed in response
They were also largely removed from direct involvement with

2

classroom teachers and syllabus reform.
status, and leadership. 1

Ostensibly they lost power,

Those changes created uncertainty in the minds

of school staff about what the real role of the new superintendents was.
Consequently, perceptions of their work became based on hearsay and
speculation.

Rumours of more restructuring and confusion over the meaning

of 'auditing' muddied the waters even further.
Not surprisingly, the nature of the district superintendent's role has
been a subject of ongoing debate over the past three years and is likely to
remain so for sometime yet.

Such activity is necessary if all the

stakeholders are to reach common understanding and agreement.

This report

is offered as a contribution to the eventual achievement of that goal.

It

explores a range of pressing issues which affect the definition of the
superintendent's role.

In doing so, it attempts to avoid duplicating the

work of the Organisation Development Unit and other groups.
The issues were identified in several ways, namely:

by interviewing

thirteen West Australian superintendents, 2 three Ministry officers in
this state, and a range of educationists in New South Wales, Victoria, and
South Australia;

and by reviewing some of the literature on restructuring

in Australia and New Zealand.

On the basis of material collected from

those sources, a draft report was written and circulated for comment to 31

1

One superintendent questioned this claim. He said, "I don't agree
that the position is necessarily less 'powerful'; it's more a
change in emphasis - less observable with teachers, more with
principals."

2

Of the thirteen interviewed, five were 'new' (appointed to the
superintendency after the Better Schools Report) and eight were
superintendents before 1987; a third were from country districts
and the rest were in the cl ty.
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district superintendents and a small informal reference group. 3
Twenty seven superintendents took time to offer feedback.

Overall,

their responses endorsed the general themes or theses of the draft report.
They also provided information for correcting factual inaccuracies,
qualifying some general statements, and confirming broad claims.

As a

result, the amended report is stronger than the original and has been
constructed from c.ommunication with nearly all the superintendents.

At an

individual level, different superintendents disagreed with or questioned
different particular points and comments.

Generally, where those responses

were brief or solitary, they have been included as footnotes.

The longer

and less isolated dissenting responses are presented in a separate chapter
at the end of the report.
Most of what ls said in the following pages consists of ideas provided
by superintendents.

However they are not responsible for the way their

comments have been selected, interpreted, and structured.

Therefore,

despite the fact that on different aspects of various issues the
superintendents have been left to speak for themselves, this report can not
be taken as necessarily representing the views of the superintendency.
Similarly, whilst the study was carried out under the auspices of the
International Institute for Polley and Administrative Studies (IIPAS), the
researcher was given a free hand to conduct an independent inquiry.
Consequently, the report should not be seen as a position paper of the
Institute.

3

There are 29 district superintendent positions in Western
Australia. One superintendent declined to participate in the
study. The extra three were those on leave or seconded to Central
Office. The reference group consisted of a school principal, two
district office consultants, and four people at Central Office.
Because these people never met as a group, they are better
regarded as a collection of individuals who constituted a
reference set.
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Unless otherwise indicated, all the inset single-line-spaced quotations
are comments made by superintendents.

The same applies to the footnotes.

In a few instances the term Executive in these quotations has been
substituted for the name of particular individuals.

Moreover, some of the

quotations have been "edited to remove the hesitations and repetitions of
ordinary speech ...... and sometimes with intervening statements on other
topics deleted" (Connell 1985:7).
After the draft report was circulated, a few reviewers claimed they
could put a name to nearly all the superintendents' comments quoted in the
text.

Several said words to the effect, "I can identify comments made by

Superintendent X and Superintendent Y."
interviewed.

Interestingly neither X nor Y were

It would be a pity if anyone became preoccupied with that

type of exercise.

The superintendents' comments bring to the study a

degree of richness, authenticity, and urgency that would not be possible
had they been excluded.

The comments were made in good faith, reported in

good faith, and deserve to be received in good faith.

This is not. to say

they must be agreed with, but it does mean they should be examined
constructively and openly rather than treated dismissively and
prejudicially.

When examining these comments, then, it is important for

readers to focus on the issues rather than the individuals, on points
rather than personalities, and on what was said rather than on who said it.
The study owes a lot to the thirty four people who, despite busy
schedules, made time to be interviewed and respond thoughtfully to the
draft report.

Also, it would not have been conducted or completed without

the· support and encouragement of Dr Margaret Crowley, Director of IPPAS.
A final point warrants particular mention:

This report does not

document the substantial contribution made by superintendents to the
development of Better Schools throughout the state;

that is one of the

5

drawbacks of an approach which focusses on unresolved issues.

Furthermore,

because of the issues-based approach, the spotlight in this study tends to
settle on areas of dissatisfaction, confusion, and conflict caused by
radical change over the past few years.

For that reason, the report

reflects the superintendents' perspectives on events leading up to the
present rather than their visions for the future.

Unless readers keep

these methodologically driven constraints constantly in mind they may form
the view that superintendents are a less-than-optimistic group.
impression would be quite unfair.

Such an

As people who have seen superintendents

at close quarters will testify, any pessimism conveyed in this report ls

.

decisively outweighed by the high level of professionalism that
characterizes their work and the positive nature of their outlook on the
direction of education in Western Australia.

6

CHAPTER TWO

A TWO TIER SYSTEM

Restructuring

"In most western countries. two apparently contradictory
developments seem to have been occurring over schools.
There has been a tendency to push more and more
responsibility on to the local schools ....... This tendency
has carried labels like decentralisation and devolution,
privatisation and participation ....... It is a movement
away from the centre and toward diversified control.
The second development is recentralisation; governments
and ministers have tried to reassert control in several key
areas like resource management, measuring outcomes;
programme budgeting, teacher appraisal · and setting global
priorities. This second transition has been accompanied by
formal restructuring of education systems so that the lines
of control are simplified and made more direct ........
The two movements - a simultaneous decentralising and
recentralising - are implied in Peters and Waterman's term
'loose/tight structures'. a common characteristic of their .
identified excellent companies. It is as though in areas of
central importance to the health of the whole organisation
there is firm central control; and where creativity,
entrepreneurship and local initiative are needed, there is
wider freedom given to the member units" {Beare, Caldwell
and Millikan 1989:71).

In some places, the simultaneous recentralising and decentralising has
led to a two tier system.

For example, before 1988, the administration of

the Victorian state education system was divided into three tiers - the
centre, the regions, and the schools.
implemented.

In that year, a new structure was

It consists not of three tiers but of two - a unified State

Office and schools.

The centre, as previously known, was abolished.

regions, as previously known. were abolished.

The

There are still branches at

the centre and offices in eight regions but they are combined to form a
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unified State Office (Victorian Ministry of Education 1987:6).
Similarly, before 1988, the administration of New Zealand's state
education system was divided into three tiers - the centre, the regions,
and the schools.
structure.

In that year, the Picot Report recommended a new

It consists not of three tiers but of two - a central Ministry

and schools.

The regions were abolished and no formal administrative

structure was set up at district level.

Instead, within the proposed new

system, "each institution receives most of its funding directly from a
central agency, undertakes responsibility for defining its objectives
within national objectives, and has control of the resources available to
it" (Picot 1988:53).
In Western Australia, before 1987, the administration of the state
education system was divided into three tiers - the centre, the regions,
and the schools. 1

In that year, a new structure was set up along lines

recommended in the Better Schools Report.

Arguably, it consists not of

three tiers but of two - a unified Central Office and schools.
the district offices are not a third tier.

That is,

The district superintendents

are part of the unified Central Office and the other staff in the district
offices belong to the schools.2

Reapoaaea
1

"Administrative control in primary schools only.
controlled from the centre."

Secondary was

2

"I think this is simplistic. All district office staff operate
between Central Office and schools. Their alignment depends on
the task being undertaken."
"Not quite true. 'Other staff' (S.D.O's) are expected to be
curriculum missionaries as well as school-owned facilitators."

8

Rationale

Western Australia established education regions some fifteen years
ago.

They were a form of middle management designed to broaden the

administrative base of the Education Department and bring centrally
determined programmes and services closer to schools.

In practice, they

limited the scope of schools to respond to the needs of their communities
and they restricted the capacity of Central Office to respond to the needs
of schools.

Their removal was intended to rectify this situation and

increase the power of schools and the centre.
Up to a point the regional offices did provide more decentralisation of
decision making - but only for the regional superintendents, not for the
schools. 3

If anything, they brought schools under closer central

scrutiny than was the case in earlier times when schools were better
placed to be 'out of sight, out of mind'.
At the primary school level, the regional offices also perpetuated a
culture of paternalism and learned dependency, both of which effectively
prevented schools becoming the optimal units for educational change.

(At

the secondary level, subject superintendents based at Central Office
performed that function.)

For example, before 1987 it was the

superintendent who assessed individual teachers and recommended their
permanency - not the principals.

It was the superintendent who evaluated

the school programme and determined the most effective way of raising
students' performance - not the people in the school. 4

It was the

Repoases
3

"A negative view. Opportunities existed for 'having a say'
through the regional superintendent and for cooperative
planning."

4

"True, but the how was important. Schools and teachers provided
the evidence for the report - not very different from
demonstrating accountability."

9

superintendent who was responsible for causing significant changes to
occur - not members of the local school community (Organisation
Development Unit 1990A).

As some former regional superintendents

explained, those times have changed.
"In the old days I was king of the regional office. We had
a separate identity. Now the district office only exists
to the extent that it helps schools develop the school
development plan; that is, we are only facilitators, not
curriculum experts."
"The regional superintendent was seen as the super
principal. If any problems arose then the superintendent
would tell people what to do."
"We don't have the same professional autonomy that we used
to have. In the past I could send out my own regional
policies that I made up by myself.
"The regional offices were proactive in putting up and
funding professional development programmes, making schools
an offer they couldn't refuse. Now we don't do anything
unless requested; we are in response mode. We are always
leading from behind. The Ministry and schools set the
state of play."!!
Apart from inhibiting the development of self-determining schools, the
regional offices - as mini Education Departments - added to the
fragmentation of Head Office, weakened its control, and thereby obstructed
the management of change.

In the interests of setting up a responsive

bureaucracy they had to be disbanded and replaced by district offices.

A

responsive bureaucracy focuses on the needs of clients rather than the
needs of the system.

In the case of education, that means a desire and a

Responses

!I

"It should be made clear that some former superintendents who are
now district superintendents considered there were major
weaknesses in the regional structure. Similarly, there were
major problems with the secondary subject superintendency. Too
many of this group saw themselves as 'heirs apparent' to key
Central Office positions. I saw many prospective teachers with
· strong academic and performance backgrounds 'turned off' teaching
as a result of their dealings with some arrogant subject
superintendents."

10

capacity to respond quickly and flexibly to the needs of schools
(Victorian Ministry of Education 1985:5.5).

It also means that, "The

administrative system should be simple and uncomplicated with as few
layers and sections as practicable.

There should be no services

overlapped or paralleled by others" (Picot 1988:4).

To regard district

offices as a separate tier, then, places the prospect of a responsive
bureaucracy at risk.
There is another reason why the 'districts' should not be seen as an
independent third tier;
parts.

they are supposed to be only the sum of their

A high school is more than the sum of its subject departments;

for example, it has whole school policies.
more than the sum of its schools;
policies. 6

The state education system is

for example, there are system-wide

But districts can not impose things like goals, priorities,

policies, regulations, curriculum frameworks, and staffing decisions on
schools in the same way that Central Office can. 7

Furthermore, they

have no basis outside of the education system for their existence or
identity.

They have no social, political, or economic reason to be.a

Their boundaries do not coincide with any sporting, cultural or government
divisions. 9

They cannot raise funds through local rates and taxes.

Reaponaea

s

"Only a handful."

1

"To be only the sum of its parts would hardly allow for
effective operation. The district office staff need a home base
of support, a team awareness, a coherence, and a knowledge of
their team strength."

8

"Try doing away with district offices in the country and there
will be political reasons to be."

9

"We've redrawn PCAP boundaries to fit state education district
boundaries."

11

Factors Confounding a Two Tier System

Under a two tier system, districts are simply nominal entities which
house two separate groups - superintendents from Central Office on the one
hand, and consultants for the schools on the other.

Unless that

distinction is accepted and observed, the change from a three to a two
tier system will not occur.

Nor will it happen unless it is recognised

that tiers exist not only organisationally but also in the minds of
people.

The obstacles to be faced are cultural as well as institutional.

It is useful then to examine some of the factors that so far have
confounded the development of a two tier system.
Throughout the first year of the new system (1988), it might have
seemed that not a lot had changed.

The 28 regional superintendent

positions under the old system were replaced by 29 district
superintendents.to

Like their predecessors, the district

superintendents were made responsible for some 25-30 schools and given the
task of supervising the performance of the whole school, not just one
subject within schools.

In many cases, they simply took over the offices

of the regional superintendents.

On top of that. the Better Schools

Report explicitly outlined the setting up of three levels - school,
district, and Central Office.
Also, during the early stages of setting up the districts the
superintendents were often portrayed as leaders of their own distinct
domain.

For instance, when they visited schools, met community groups,

and were written up in the local media, it ws.s as 'district

Responses
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"Though, the 28 regional superintendents worked out of only 15
regional offices."

12

superintendents' - not Central Office superintendents.

Inside the

district office they were required to act as managers - supervising staff,
chairing major committees, and authorising financial transactions.
Frequently, that led to a sense of ownership and a view that the manager
of the district office had to be the superintendent.

Again, these

perceptions reinforced an impression that superintendents were leaders of
their own distinct domain. 11

At times it was more than an impression.

"Initially I had trouble changing.
district office staff."

I wanted to own all the

"Superintendents who have 'I am the principal of 37 primary
schools' mentality are those who want to be the boss of the
district office."
"When I first became a superintendent I tried to be the
principal of thirty principals."
"I've stayed a mother hen because school development
planning is such a complex business. I needed to keep it
going and add my experience to it and prevent five district
office staff going out and giving five different messages
on school development processes. At the beginning the
district office staff needed my hand at the tiller. But
I'm stepping away now because I've got more and more work
to do."
"The traditional role of the superintendent has involved
being in charge of the district office. Where the PEO's
have been used it has led to some difficulties in schools.
The PEO comes to be regarded as an assistant superintendent
and ls cast into a decision making role across schools in
the absence of the superintendent, and schools have
objected to the difficulties of getting to the
superintendent because he has been screened from the
principals by the PEO."
"Most district offices have the superintendent in charge.
It'll come to a head when the audit role takes on the
dimensions that it should. Then the district
superintendent wlll have no time to manage the district
office. Up till now they have."

Responses
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"They still are. I think to some extent they shall continue to
exert some leadership because district superintendents have
leadership ablllty and to some extent it is needed."

13

"The district office needs the superintendent for unity."
"Principals have enough to do managing their own schools.
They shouldn't have to manage the district. I have
responsibility for the management of the district office.
I'm an integral part of the district office and its
services because when I'm out in school I'm able to keep in
touch with their needs and a lot of what goes on in the
district office should reflect what goes on in schools. I
prefer to operate out of the district office, not from a
separate office. It if gets to the point of me having to
be out of the district office then I'd resign because I'd
be just a police person."
Several other factors continue to confound the two tier system.

For

example, the districts, like the regions, have a material identity of
their own:

geographical boundaries;

buildings that are physically

separate from Central Office and schools;
letterheads;
support start.

district mottos, logos,

and 'district' personnel - superintendents, consultants, and
As several superintendents observed:

"There is considerable misunderstanding throughout the
Ministry about the two tier system. But while we exist
physically, there will always be confusion."
"The three separate locations (school, district, centre)
create a perception of three tiers. Confusion, in the
perception of schools, has resulted because of this
matter. The superintendent was proclaiming a
support-to-principals' role while on site and this seemed
to contradict the idea of the superintendent being part of
Central Office."
Also, group dynamics ensure that the staff in each district office
become more than a collection of individuals.

The superintendent,

consultants,11 and clerical staff share the same accommodation, interact
on a daily and collegial basis, and are generally employed under

12

NB: Throughout this report, the term district 'consultant'
refers to district education officers, school development
officers, and student service officers - even though that ls not
the official meaning of the word within the system.

14

conditions that differ from those of staff in schools. 13

Over time they

become a group with their own culture, structure, ethos, identity, and set
of loyalties. 14
group.

The superintendents are an integral part of this

It is unrealistic to expect them to be otherwise.

Thus, in the

words of one superintendent, "The best moments come when I'm with my own
district office staff."

Almost invariably they become the leader of the

group, partly because:
"We're only allowed one promotional position. Therefore
the district office staff don't have the status and
experience to manage things, they are just teachers. So
the superintendent needs to be in charge, to sympathize,
and keep the overall direction right."
"Superintendents still have to make the 'hard' decisions in
district offices. No one else has the authority or power
base at present."
For their part, the consultants want the superintendent to be the leader
of the district office - at least according to some superintendents.
"The district office staff want a superintendent as someone
to identify with, someone they know they can talk to about
career and personal situations."
"Why don't superintendents delegate their authority?
Because district office staff want to relate to a manager
at the superintendent level rather than to a PEO."
"The district office staff don't want to lose contact with
the superintendent. They want direct contact, mainly to
talk about their career and promotion."
The end result or such group dynamics is that fre'}uently the
superintendent and consultants come to see themselves as belonging to the
same tier, and an independent one at that.

Responses
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"Guidance officers in district offices work under the same
conditions as teachers in schools."

14

"There is no problem with this as long as all efforts of the
group are to support schools and achieve their own and Ministry
or Education determined priorities."

15

For historical and organisational reasons, school staff also see
district superintendents and consultants as belonging to the same tier.
From long experience of working in a hierarchical organisation they have
come to regard districts as being "somewhere in the pecking order between
themselves and the Central Office, but if anything more closely aligned to
the Central Office than to them" (Organisation Development Unit
19908: 1 ). 111

Within the present structure, the existence of line

management reinforces an image of the organisation as being hierarchical
and centralized rather than flat and devolved.
Another obstacle to establishing a two tier system is that Central
Office uses district offices to perform a range of tasks, such as:
promoting Ministry initiatives, handling mlnlsterials, organising
inservice work, and carrying out various administrative functions particularly those related to the collection and distribution of
information and money.

For instance:

"We divvy up some money: for example, the minor works
programme. It's a role we have. At present we operate as
a distribution point for Ministry funds. We have at least
a dozen committees. Some of these functions will disappear
because schools should be allowed to govern themselves."
"If parents phone Central Office, then Central Office
deflects the calls back to us."
"Take the new language, maths, and art syllabuses. Central
Office has given us responsibility for monitoring the
implementation of them and actually implementing them. We
run the induction programmes, the inservice programmes."
"The district office ls not determined Just by schools.
The Ministry installs people in the district office to do
Central Office things, industrial things, tied Commonwealth
things."

Reapoaaes

1!1

"Schools see our district office as being aligned with them, not
Central Office."
"I don't think so! More closely aligned to schools would be the
general perception."

16

"Our role is too big. I shouldn't have to handle
ministerials. One Minister tied. up my officers for two
weeks getting information and we never knew if it was of
any use."
"Much of the confusion occurs at top levels in Central
Office and when Central Office staff try to use district
office staff to do the 'hard' things."
Sometimes these delegated tasks take priority over the district office's
primary function of providing support to schools. 16

As a result,

district office staff run the risk of being seen as Central Office
functionaries rather than auxillaries of the school. 17

They also face

the problem of trying to please multiple masters - the superintendent,
other Central Office people, and the schools.

An associated problem is

that of having to choose between different groups competing for their
loyality, as was the case during the industrial dispute last year.

A Clarifying Step

A number of superintendents have thought about a straightforward way to
negate the factors confounding a two tier system.

It involves formally

separating the office of the superintendent from the office of the
district consultants.

The two offices could remain in the same building

but they would be officially independent of each other.

Responses
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"Yes, and most district office staff want to be seen as
having some sort of 'power'.

17

"Put another way, district offices are located within the
demilitarized zone between schools and Central Office, thus:
Schools

District Offices

Central Office

t
{Them) Us

{Us) Them"

17

The office of the district superintendent would:
o

be controlled from Central Office

o

have its own executive support staff and budget

o

handle all tasks currently delegated from Central Office
to the districts, and any other tasks that may be
delegated

o

have line management responsibilities towards staff in
schools and the office of the district consultants.

The office of the district consultants would:
o

be managed by a principal education officer (PEO)

o

have its own executive support staff and budget

o

be staffed by people who have no line management
responsibilities towards the schools

o

be controlled by a district-based decision-making group
(DBDMG), or district management committee (DMC),
consisting of an elected group of principals, deputy
principals, and other school staff in the district

o

not handle any tasks delegated from Central Office,
without authorisation from the DBDMG or DMC

o

be renamed school support centres (as in Victoria) or
education resource centres (as in N.S.W.).

Under a structure where the district superintendent is formally
separated from the district office, the relationship between the two is
similar to that between superintendents and schools.

In effect, the

district office becomes another school in the district:

the PE0 18 is

the principal, the other district office staff are the school staff, and

.

-------------------------------------------------------

ResPOaaes
1e

"This (PEO) is a title with unfortunate connotations." [The
term PEO conflicts with the spirit of a flat structure.
However, it does highlight and enhance the idea of the district
office being another school in the district, complete with a
'principal'. J

18

the DBDMG is the SBDMG. 19

A slight difference is that the DBDMG is more

of a management committee than the SBDMG;

it has a more prominent role in

producing a district plan than the SBDMG does with the school development
plan.

Correspondingly, the PEO ls more a manager and less an instructional

leader than is the school principal. 20

The principals on the DMC

collectively constitute the instructional leader of the district office.
Furthermore, under such a structure, the superintendent is responsible
for auditing the district plan and for managing the performance of the
PEO.

The PEO, in turn, is responsible for the performance management of

the district office staff.

In other words, "the manager of the district

office is accountable to the district superintendent and the board of
management, Just as the principal is accountable to the district
superintendent and the school decision making group.

The district

superintendent can no more direct the staff in the district office than he
er she can direct school staff" (Organisation Development Unit
10908:5). 21

This proposal relieves superintendents from managing the district office
and being responsible for the professional development and appraisal of all
district office staff.

It thereby allows thetn more time to

Reapoaaea
19

"This ls a much easier task in the metro area. It is not as
simple in the country, and it is costly. Also, many principals
in country districts are young and inexperienced and are busy
enough learning their new positions without taking on yet
another committee chore."
"There ls a danger of schools getting what they want rather than
what they need, based on quality information. It would be okay
for some principals but more training is still needed for
others."

20

"The district officer should do the administration tasks.
PEO manages the support functions for schools."

21

"I think 70-80% of superintendents would not like or agree with
this statement."

The
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supervise the performance of all schools in their district and provide
principals with professional support to manage the development and
implementation of school plans.22
District consultants also benefit from the proposal.23

No longer

would they need to feel responsible for ensuring that schools are working
within Ministry policy or implementing Ministry initiatives - that job
would rest exclusively with the office of the district superintendent.

No

longer would they be caught in the middle of competing claims for their
loyalty and services - their clear commitment would be to the schools.

No

longer would they have to feel like outsiders or intruders when visiting
schools - they would be delivering programmes and services requested by the
schools.

On the last point, however, there is evidently a danger that:

"As long as staff arrive in the district office without a
clear understanding of what their purpose is, yet
determined to be useful to schools, they will very likely
fall into the trap of busily responding to school requests
regardless of their nature. The skills of consultancy are
complex and only acquired with difficulty over a long
period of time. It is unrealistic to expect that teachers
can be plucked from the classroom and installed as a
consultant a few weeks later with almost no preparation.
Instead of consulting with schools, what tends to happen
is that the consultant tries to solve the problems the
schools serve up in order to gain some credibillty or be of
use. If he or she is successful at solving the problem,
the school will continue to refer problems to the
consultant for solutions rather than get better at solving
its own problems. If the consultant is unsuccessful at
solving the problem, schools decry the value of such people
and feel unsupported.
To be able to take the problem tendered by the school,
frame it in a way that encourages the school to examine it

Responses
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"The above advocacy tends to gloss over the diversity
principle. Do all district offices have to be the same? I
think not. Discharge of the functions must be in the context of
local factors. You could just as easily obtain the same outcome
with differing structures and various role relationships."

2a

"What about the public servants?
to be deployed."

Consider how they would need
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in a context of self determining schools, and then assist
the school to mobilize its problem solving capacity, is not
easy. If we want district consultants to enhance the
school's ability to solve its own problems (something
fundamental to self determining schools) then we need to
commit resources and develop the human resource policies to
support this. Putting people in district offices and
expecting them to behave like skilled consultants is not ·
good enough" (Organisation Development Unit 19908:4-5).J

Future Prospects

Despite the obstacles referred to earlier, there are grounds for
claiming that a two tier system is evolving along the lines of the
proposal outlined above.

Now that the district offices are largely

established, the superintendents are disengaging from much of the
day-to-day administration.

They are concentrating more on providing

professional development and support for principals and supervising the
implementation of the school development plan guidelines.
Also, district boards of management are being set up and controlled by
school principals.24

In some districts, principal education officers

have been appointed on a trial basis to oversee the running of the
office.

In other districts, an office manager has been appointed from the

ranks of the school consultants.

These developments allow the

superintendents to spend more time in schools and less time in the
district office.

Responses
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"Is this real?"
"What does this mean?
anyone."

These boards are not controlled by

"This is easier in the metro.
in my district."

It is not desired by principals

21

Two other developments warrant mention.

One is that some districts are

thinking of combining forces to provide one large resource centre."

In

doing so they will highlight the district office's primary role of
providing support for schools. 26
information technology.

The other development involves

In future Central Office will have progressively

less need to use the district as a medium for collecting and distributing
data related to schools.

Instead it will be able to interface directly

with schools through faxes, computer noticeboards, and so on. 27
Finally, as the following comments indicate, some superintendents
have a concept of the present and a vision of the future consistent with a
two tier type system.
"The district superintendent will gradually come out of the
district office and principals will have total control.
I'd rather be in, but I think I'll end up outside auditing. But if I'm in I'll be the big daddy over the
top.
"The district office is resourced from the school resource
allocation to perform functions of economies of scale that
schools can't perform by themselves. The alternative is to
distribute district office staff to the schools without
remainder."
"The district superintendent is an extension of Central
Office; the Chief Executive Officer determines the future
of the district superintendent. The district office is an
extension of the schools; the schools determine the future
of the district office."
"The district office operation is in two parts: the office
of the district superintendent is seen quite rightly as
75-25 Central-Office-related rather than school-related.
The rest of the district office is a support and service
centre and should be seen as 20-80 Central Office versus
schools."

Responses
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"This is the case in a number of districts.
legacy of the old regional structure."

26

"Dependent on the resources provided;
resources should be in schools."

27

"I wonder when - 2001 ?"

It is more a

that is, 'book'
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"In our district office management plan there is no
directional role, only assisting and supporting.
Leadership comes from the centre, not the district office."
"There ls a problem because some superintendents can't
separate themselves from the district office. Others can.
I would have a job to do without the school development
officers. They could go to become part of big support
centres which are needed because of economies of scale.
These centres will happen because we need to devolve
staffing closer to schools."
"We made a bid for the district office to be owned by the
schools. The district management committee decides our
profile and budget; that is, the resources in the district
office are owned by the schools. The DMC has authority
because it appoints the E.0.1 and the P.S.4. Only me and
my secretary are decided by Central Office."
"Our District Plan clearly states that the district office
is owned by schools."
"We're heading in the direction of the district
superintendent working independently of the district office
operation. We've rationalised our resource centre. We've
sent items that really belong to schools back to schools.
We only have resources that schools can't afford. We're
here to help schools become self-determining. Half our
staff are located in schools working on the spot with
teachers. We are purists on Better Schools. There isn't a
half way house on this. The district offices do not exist
to suit the people who work in them"
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CHAPTER THREE

THE CENTRE TIER:

SEPARATING OPERATIONS FROM POLICY

Restructuring took place in Victoria so that the unified State Office
could provide effective educational leadership.

Before 1988, the regions

in that state were meant to relieve Central Office of direct involvement
in the administration and management of schools and the system.

However,

the transfer of operational functions to regions was partial and
incomplete.

As a result, the centre continued to concentrate on

operations "at the expense of the development of a strong policy focus for
the Schools Division."

It therefore lacked a strategic planning capacity

to "anticipate and respond to the changing education needs of society,
schools and students. "1
The Picot Committee identified a further reason for separating
operations from policy.2

Until 1988 in New Zealand, there was "a

blurring of policy making and provider roles in that policy makers also
have responsibility for putting their proposals into effect - so that an
overcommitment to preconceived ideas may result."

Picot argued that,

"Where these roles are separated, it is easier for the policy implementers
to see that a particular policy ls unsatisfactory" (1988:30).

1

Victorian Ministry of Education (1987), The Structure and
Organisation of the Schools Division, Melbourne, page 5.

2

The separation of policy from operations is also a feature of the
Collaborative School Management Cycle developed by Caldwell and
Spinks. This model advocates at the individual school level,
there be a "clear and unambiguous specification of those phases
which are the concern of the group for policy-making ['policy
group') and of other phases which are the concern of the groups
responsible for implementing policy ['programme teams') - (Beare,
Caldwell and Millikan 1989:133).
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In Western Australia, apparently a similar need was seen for separating
operations from policy.

Within that separation, the district

superintendents are clearly located in the operations rather than policy
section.

It is a position some are most unhappy with.

For example:

"The issue of input to policy really is frustrating. Our
input is nil because our feedback to Central Office is or
seems to be disregarded. I believe we must form and write
policy guidelines related to operations because surely we
are gaining 'expertise' in this division."
"I think Central Office undervalues and underestimates the
ability and potential of the district superintendency. No
other group is both closer to where the 'rubber hits the
road' and in touch with Central Office 'visions' and
efforts."

The Operations Directorate and Polley Development

Until July 1990, the Schools Division in Central Office consisted of
four directorates - Curriculum, Corporate Services, Human Resources, and
Operations.3

Unlike the other directorates, the Operations Directorate

had no discrete policy branch.
operations.

By name and function it was concerned with

It consisted of four directors and the 29 superintendents.

The four directors were members of the Schools Division Executive and
therefore had a formal opportunity to participate in policy making.
However, there is a widespread view among the superintendents that the
directors of operations made little impact on policy, either inside or
outside of Executive meetings.
"The directors meet once a week and anyone can introduce a
project at these (Executive) meetings which gives them a
certain democratic nature but the chair is all powerful.
We get minutes from these meetings."

-------------------------------------------------------3

Before July 1990, Central Office consisted of the Schools Division
and the Policy and Resources Division. Recent changes have disbanded
the two-divisional structure and replaced it with a four-divisional
one. The old Operations Directorate is now located in the new
Sch_ools Operation Division which consists of Operations, Curriculum,
E~ecutive Support, and the Organisation Development Unit.
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"The directors of operations are on the superintendents'
side. There is no advantage for them to buck the
superintendents. They are on Corporate Executive and have
the power to argue for resources. But they get outgunned
and fail to represent our interests."
"Central Office has a low regard for superintendents.
$15 million of Commonwealth money was spent without even
consulting the directors of operations."
"The superintendents had no input into the Corporate Plan
(Schools Division). I made suggestions to my director of
operations but he said, 'It's too late now because it has
gone to the printers.' We should have discussed it if we
are to implement it, if we are to feel involved with it."
"They are trying but they haven't got it right yet. They
get the feedback but don't incorporate it in policies. The
directors of operations should be formulating policies but
they aren't."
"I was accused by principals of not handing feedback up the
line and was told that line management won't work because
the directors of operations don't give the feedback to
Corporate Executive."
"There was a feeling of a powerful clique in the Executive
and that the directors of operations were not privy to that
exclusive group."
At Executive level, policy on curriculum and human resources comes
through the directorates responsible for those two areas.

It might be

thought that because superintendents are responsible for supervising the
formulation and implementation of school development plans in individual
schools, then the directors of operations would generate policy guidelines
for constructing those plans and monitoring school performance.

However,

that task has been performed by the Organisation Development Unit, a body
which operates outside the four directorates and reports directly to
Executlve. 4

A number of superintendents explained the director of

operation's position on this matter in these terms:
"The directors of operations had no staff or funds to do it
(policy development). No budget, no support staff, nothing."

Responses
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"The ODU has reported to a director of operations.
reports to an executive director now."

It probably
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"The directors of operations were kept 'barefoot and
pregnant'. Apart from the limited resources they can filch
from the Executive Support Branch, they each have a
secretary. Policy development and generation requires time
for thinking, investigation, writing - and many hands. I
have more resources in my district office to do policy
development than my director of operations had in Central
Office."
"These four August persons lack the arms and legs and time
to be involved in real policy making. They rarely get
above the administrative level.
11

The superintendents visit Central Office mainly to attend senior
officer meetings and meet with their directors of operations.
officer meetings are held about every seven weeks.

The senior

So far they have been

largely briefing sessions with the superintendents being 'talked at' by
their superordinates or an expert on some new policy or programme.
Apparently, there is very little debate or opportunity for meaningful
comment from superintendents at these meetings.
"At senior officer meetings we get documents and go into
small groups and are asked, 'Do you agree with this or
not?' But there isn't enough time to consider it.
11

"The Executive are managerially naive. They should get
groups, including superintendents, to give state of the
nation reports. They don't know they are not telling us!
They don't attempt to inform superintendents about
curriculum initiatives."
"The senior officer meetings are briefings to bring us up
to date. But often we get stale information because of
leaks. There is no debate because the decisions have
already been made. It's hard to be told, 'You will do this
and this'."
"When something difficult comes up, like post compulsory
schooling, we are told, 'We need to pick your brains,'
which means 'We want you to agree with us'."
"It's difficult to get consensus with 29 superintendents.
Sometimes our recommendations are taken away and bounced
off principals and then modified and you can get a bland
melting down and that's not always the best thing. Then we
are told, 'But you were consulted'.
11

"The senior officer meetings are called SOB's - senior
officer briefings. There is no managing upwards, just top
down rhetoric."
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"At the senior officer meetings, the directors of
operations say nothing, except ( ..... ).
They are not
leaders. They don't make statements on directions. They
don't make educational statements. They don't make a
difference. "!I
"Some speakers are frivolous at senior officer meetings.
The overheads (transparencies) are poor, there are no
documents, no proper information or feedback."
"The history of these meetings is fascinating and
significant. They started off with briefings from the
Executive being a small part and the professional
development of superintendents being a big part. Then we
had a few bad ones and a joint committee of some Executive
members and superintendents was formed to organise them.
After awhile that committee was suddenly scrapped - no one
knows why - and the meetings changed from being development
to being briefing sessions and they became top down all the
way." 6
Sometimes, on the day before or after senior officer meetings, 7 the
superintendents get together with their directors of operations.

On these

occasions, policy issues can be raised and discussed on a collegial and
collaborative basis.

Significantly, the four groups of superintendents

meet separately, never collectively.

Most of the sessions are devoted to

policy clarification rather than policy development - though on this point
there are perceived variations between the groups.
"Our director of operations usually chairs the meeting but
sometimes shares it around. It is up to the directors to
say how often these meetings are held, what's on the

Respo•aes
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7

"This comment falls to recognise who called these meetings and in
most cases it wasn't the directors of operations. Also, agendas in
most cases were not what the directions of operations wanted."
"All these comments highlight the communication/consultation
problem in our organisation. If we asked principals we'd get the
same response - it teachers, again the same response."
"These meetings are becoming more appropriate to meet the needs of
district superintendents and to enable more effective input/
feedback through the district superintendents."
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agenda, and who presents what. There is a huge variation
between groups. Our group moved ahead because of our
director of operations. He gave us responsibility, got us
on committees, and gave a good leadership model. Other
directors of operations said, 'I'm not going to tell my
superintendents what to do because they are professional'."
"The director of operations meetings are wimpish - just
talk - blanc mange - what we discuss doesn't go to
Corporate Executive. ( ...... ) does what he wants. There's
no consultation."
"Most superintendents meet quarterly with their directors
of operations on a one-to-one basis for the purpose of
performance management and appraisal. These meetings are
useful for our own personal professional development but
not for offerring any input into policy.
"Our input into the agenda is zero. The director of
operations decides the agenda and whether we'll be able to
contribute to policy making."
"The director of operations' meetings deal with nuts and
bolts issues; for example, any trouble in the districts,
computers, the school fees debate. Sometimes we hold our
hands up in horror and we have a debate about some issue
and that is taken note of and reflected up to Executive."
"Our director of operations was charged with developing
regulations about school-based decision-making groups and
had to deal with seven varieties of regulations. We
debated the regulations ourselves in our group. It almost
got to the final stage, then WACSSO had their say and it
went back to square one. In that case we were able to
influence policy."
"With my director of operations there ls some scope for us
to exercise educational leadership because he gave us a
chance to contribute to a policy paper he was writing, to
share ideas and use each other's ideas across the
districts."
A few superintendents are invited to sit on Central Office committees
that do form policy.

These provide, "a mechanism to have a real say, but

you only get on them by invitation"

and some superintendents are

unclear about how many are invited.
"I've made expressions of interest but I'm on no Central
Office committee. I don't even know which superintendents
are representing superintendents on committees. The
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directors of operations haven't set up a structure for
that. It's their responsibility. ".8
Although the predominant view is that they do not have much opportunity
for participating in policy making, some superintendents did say they were
adequately consulted - at least on a number of issues.
"The superintendents had a big input on post compulsory
schooling policy, occupational health and welfare, lower
secondary studies (the 160 hours requirement}, and the
guidelines for school development plans."
"The superintendents' policy domain is school development.
We had an opportunity to provide input on the school
development guidelines because there was a draft and we had
a workshop on it. Those who complain are probably the same
ones who complain they are too busy anyhow."
"The School Development Plan Guidelines - we had input.
The Schools Division Corporate Plan - we had input."
(And, more obliquely} "Lots of documents fall off backs of
trucks. We're not sure of the status of these. We told
Executive to have one central distribution point - that if
this is a policy or draft document then it has to have the
stamp of the Corporate Executive on it. If it doesn't have
that stamp then it's an opinion paper. That would avoid
confusion as to whether a document is official or not. The
Executive wants to manage and control by having a shortened
line management - executive, director of operations,
superintendent, principal. They keep trying to say that
this is the only line. I'm saying it's not the only line
that exists - because of gossip and documents that fall off
backs of trucks."
Most superintendents would reply to those claims by saying that their
input is reactive, not proactive;

they tend to be given drafts of policy

documents to respond to rather than an opportunity to be in on the ground

Responses
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"I've seen a list - saw it in mid 1989."
"Is it? Or, is it up to the district superintendents to show some
initiative?"
"It would appear to me that district superintendents are recruited
for Central Office policy developing committees on their perceived
expertise rather than to represent the body of superintendents."
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floor.9

Furthermore, because these documents seem to be fait accomplis,

the level of consultation is regarded as tokenism.to

Some Options

A range of options can be suggested in relation to the superintendents'
feelings outlined in this chapter.

One is to explore ways of

strengthening the capacity of the Operations Directorate (or the new
equivalent) to influence policy.

For example, perhaps the Organisation

Development Unit could become the formal policy branch of that directorate
and function as the equivalent of the policy branches of the Curriculum
and Human Resource Directorates (or the new equivalents).11

A second

option involves superintendents forming their own professional association
or institute to provide an effective voice for directly influencing
policy.

A third option is to examine the extent to which effective

corporate management does in fact require the separation of operations
from policy and then encourage superintendents to accept the consequences
of the findings. 12

Of these three options, the superintendents had most

to say about the second one.

Reaponaea
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"I have received more information regularly than the various
comments here suggest is the average."

10

"Yes, I guess so. But it's sort of like saying that a swimmer
drowned because he/she refused to swim;"

11

"This has happened with the latest changes in Central Office."

12

"Perhaps a fourth option is by communicating - by being informally
political. I know there is a limit to this, but .... "
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Superintendents Institute

Before the Better Schools Report, the superintendents belonged to a
Superintendents Institute.

It provided a vehicle through which the

superintendents could form and present a group opinion on matters of
policy.

Not all superintendents saw it as an influential body.13
"The old Superintendents Institute was not effective. It
was basically a senior officers' meeting, not an educational
forum. It was gutless, just a Head Office briefing with a
bit of an industrial arm."
"Before (198 7) there were different types of
superintendents - secondary general and subject
superintendents, regional primary and bullding
superintendents, and so on.
The old Superintendents
Institute therefore represented a cross section and the
diffused power weakened it."
"The superintendents had little input (before 1987).
Individually they did but not as a group. The Institute
was a professional arm - our bosses were part of it."

Despite these perceptions, the Superintendents Institute was regarded
by the post 1987 Executive as a threat to the management of restructuring
- at least according to some superintendents.

Consequently, they claim,

steps were taken to render it inactive and prevent a new group
forming.14

The sort of examples cited in support of this belief include

the following.

Since first appointed some three years ago, the 29

superintendents have never met alone as a group with their own
agenda.111

Their meetings have always been with other senior officers or

Responses
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"The Institute was always supportive.
members."

Senior Officers were

14

"Not really.

t!I

"We met as a group for the first time on June 14, 1990, on the
subject of the Memorandum of Agreement."

Everyone was kept too busy."

32

in small groups with a director of operations.

In the early days of

restructuring, these small groups met at separate venues.

Moreover, the

organisation of superintendents into four groups, each under a director of
operations, was not on a geographical basis. 16

As a result the groups

could not form a sense of regional identity and organise themselves
accordingly.

In short, say the superintendents, the whole process has

, been carefully managed to prevent them operating as a formal interest
group and presenting a collective statement to the policy makers.17
Typical comments were:
"We meet as senior officers, not as superintendents. There
is no forum for superintendents alone and that inhibits
superintendents reviving the Superintendents Institute."
"The Ministry wanted the new superintendents to be a part
of the system, not a separate power base. It wanted the
superintendents to have professional development rather
than a professional association."
"At the senior officer meetings the agenda ls determined by
the Executive; it's done deliberately to prevent district
offices developing power bases."
"We have never ever met as a group of thirty
superintendents and four directors of operations. We've
only met as a director of operations group of eight or as a
senior officers' group."
"We used to meet (before 1987) once a month as a total
primary superintendency. Whilst there were differences,
there was a groupness. Now we meet separately in our
director of operations' groups. There is no geographical
rationale. The power bases are divided, it's deliberate."

-------------------------------------------------------Responses

16

"I'm not sure whether a better geographical· relationship would
have made any difference. It shouldn't have been necessary.
Identity needs to emerge from policy matters and the contribution
of district superintendents to policy formulation." [In their
restructuring, N.S.W., S.A., and Victoria grouped their
districts/clusters into regions/areas on a geographical basis.
Their directors of operations, in the form of regional/area
directors are located in the regional office, not Central Office
as in W.A.)

17

"Sounds paranoid to me."
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"The Superintendents Institute represented the senior
officers of the Education Department. Then all
superintendent Jobs were abolished and existing people and
others were invited to apply for 29 positions. The
professional arm became controlled by people on high. It
was a fear type thing. People went from permanent to
acting and thought they may not get reappointed. So they
became passive and didn't want to cross the management ..
It's a matter of the past now. I wouldn't be surprised to
see the professional arm form again. At present there is a
series of informal networks which are not visible or
recognised in a formal way."
"There is a fear that the 29 superintendents will form a
powerful group so a lot of deliberate strategies are
employed to prevent the 29 getting together; for example,
seven at one hotel, six at another place. Central Office
makes sure we don't get together. If the 29 are got
together, then it's for briefings, there's no scope for us
to form a collective viewpoint on something and organise
consensus. It's deliberately done and well done. We were
told that the only way to get change is to keep everyone in
a state of apprehension, to make everyone unsure. It
worked but there would have been more acceptable, positive
ways of making it work."
Most superintendents would like to see that situation change.

In their

view, the Ministry need no longer feel threatened by the re-establishment
of a superintendents instltute. 1 e Indeed for some of them the thrust
behind such a move would come more from an interest in their own
professional development than from any urge to form a pressure group.
"A superintendents institute doesn't need to play power
games. It would be used more for professional exchange."
"The immediate threat of superintendents bucking the system
has gone because superintendents realise power goes through
the director of operations system so the Ministry won't
oppose superintendents forming a professional association,
but it will be mainly for professional development.
Other superintendents pointed out that without an association of their
own, they are industrially vulnerable.
"We're under a five year contract.
times there may be a spill again."

In two and half years

Reap0a11ea
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"Recent further moves have been made."
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"We don't have an industrial arm to represent
superintendents on salaries, etc. The old Superintendents
Institute did. We are an isolated group within the public
service; we have no say."
"The top end (of the Ministry) are paranoid about us
forming a power base. But we need a superintendents
institute, not to shoot at the boss, but for a professional·
association to protect our interests against the
government. We wouldn't be having a shot at our boss. If
its unprofessional why do doctors have a professional arm?
Take one issue - superannuation. If we go collectively to
the CSA they'd fight it for us but if we go individually
they· won't."
Clearly, then, not all of the superintendents' reasons for wanting some
form of professional organisation relate to their interest in gaining a
greater say in policy development.

Nevertheless, a desire for more

effective representation on decision making committees does form a major
part of their case for establishing a formal association.
"Now and again, the Ministry samples the views of
superintendents but it's only tokenism because a
representative superintendent speaks as an individual not
as a formal superintendents' representative who is able to
say, 'The superintendents feel this way'."
"The directors of operations aren't on all committees and
any one of them only represents one quarter of the
superintendents anyway. So representation of the
superintendency by the directors of operations is not a
satisfactory arrangement."
"It's easy to provide superintendents with the opportunity
to have input. A list of all committees of interest can be
circulated to superintendents. Then they can be asked to
list all the things we want to be proactive on, to make our
opinion known on. If I'm the representative for the
superintendents on a committee I just fax all
superintendents before a meeting and take the results to
the meeting. Fax, collect, and collate. It requires a
professional time commitment."
"We should ensure that there is a superintendent on every
Ministry committee, that a pairing system is organised to
fill absences, and that individuals adopt a process to
adequately represent the opinions of the superintendency.
That kind of representation should be set in place by the
directors of operations"
A recent event represents a variation on some of these themes.

Several

months a~o (June 1990) the country superintendents organised a meeting for
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themselves.

The agenda related to business matters for the

superintendency in country districts and focussed on interdistrict sharing
and the cost effectiveness of operations.

According to one participant:

"It was essentially a business meeting, but the appetite
for collegiate sharing of issues beyond district operations
has resulted in a planned August meeting of this group."

Closing Comments

In the management of a two tier education system, superintendents
essentially perform a control rather than leadership function;
guardians, not philosopher kings. 19

By definition and by deed, the

people who exert most influence are those who:
structure and function of the system;
culture;

make the rules;

determine the overall

shape the dominant ideology and

formulate the broad goals, objectives,

priorities, performance indicators, and policies;
range corporate and strategic plans.
this.

they are

and develop the long

Superintendents do very little of

They are supervisors and custodians of change rather than

architects and captains of change.
Some superintendents have experienced difficulty coming to terms with
what they see as a relegation of their role from a position of leadership
to something less influential.

A number of them described the process as

involving a lengthy psychological adjustment.

For example

"I used to think, 'Why can't they make up their minds and
tell us what our role is?' Then I realised it was too
early for that and I became tolerant of the delay. Then I
realised, 'Why do I need them to tell me?' The pieces of
the puzzle were pre-determined in the Better Schools
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19

"The principals in this District expect and accept leadership.
We share ideas - develop a team approach - and it works."
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Report. All one had to do was put them together. So I
formed my own view and when I saw all the pieces come
together I became comfortable. I accept my role now. I
accept that creative leadership has been destroyed, though
the principals still have it. I accept being a facilitator
The biggest problem of the superintendent's role is
the limited scope for creative leadership, though helping
principals with their school development plan may provid~
creative leadership for me. I' 11 have to wait and see."
Other superintendents, from the beginning of their appointment, had no
problem accepting that they were role takers rather than role makers.
"I need to know my director of operations' goals to help
work out my goals and strategies. It's more or less a
matter of saying to him, 'I'll try to accommodate you in
achieving your goal. You're my boss'."
"All the new superintendents are in the Ministry mode.
older ones disagree. The result is factionalisation."

The

"The Ministry as an organisation has a right to set the
parameters and superintendents have to accept the role as
defined by the management. Superintendents know what they
are applying for. If I hadn't liked it, I wouldn't have
applied. In 1987 the superintendents applied for the job
blind because there was no clear defined role - the top
wasn't telling them and schools expected them to be like
the old days."16
The next chapter documents a list of eight key accountablllty areas that
the superintendents formulated for themselves.

Interestingly, the list

contains virtually nothing related to policy development;

the focus is

overwhelmingly on operatlons.20
Given the tensions outlined in this chapter, it is appropriate to end
not with Plato but with Pericles of Athens.

When speaking for the Open

Society in about 430 B.C. he said, "Although only a few may originate a
policy we are all able to judge it."

-------------------------------------------------------Responses
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"Why?

Have we been brainwashed?"
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CHAPTER FOUR

THE SCHOOL TIER:

DIFFERENCES THAT CAUSE DIFFICULTIES

Devolution gave schools more freedom to be self-managing and more
responsibility to demonstrate accountability to the Ministry and the local
community.

It also gave principals the job of managing the implementation

of those changes.

These moves reflect two modern maxims: "let the

managers manage;

make them accountable."

The reforms did more than

simply charge principals with additional managerial tasks.

They amplified

the prlnclpal's role as change agent and instructional leader - a role
made particularly necessary by the removal of superintendents from the
business of supervising teachers and providing curriculum expertise. 1
Within the context of these changes, it can be argued that the
superintendent's job ls predomlnently twofold:
schools;

to support and audit

and to support and appraise princlpals.2

Prior to 1990,

superintendents were prevented from focussing on these roles by factors
such as:

the need to get district offices established;

in schools;

industrial action

and some uncertainty within the superintendency about what

was really expected of them.

Those obstacles have now receded into the
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Superintendents were not completely removed from direct contact
with classroom teachers: "merit promotion and unsatisfactory
reports are just some examples of direct involvement." Another
superintendent said, "It ls interesting that the CEO has brought
the Curriculum areas under the Operations mantle in the latest
restructuring."
"I find it difficult to see the relationship between the word
'support' and the separation of the district superintendent from
the district office as outlined on pages 16-20 earlier."
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background.

There seems to be a common understanding and agreement among

superintendents that their role consists of the following tasks and time
allocation:
Key Accountability Areas For District Superintendents
1.

Ensures that effective audit and review processes are in place
in schools so as to achieve educational outcomes consistent
with Ministry priorities and policies and community
expectations (25-50%).3

2.

Ensures the effective performance management of school
principals, including promotion by merit (25%).

3.

Ensures the effective and efficient operation of the District
Education Office (5-10%).

4.

Ensures that procedures are in place for the effective
resolution of conflict (5-10%).

5.

Ensures the effective and efficient allocation of resources
within the school district (5%).

6.

Ensures that Ministry policies and other significant items of
information are effectively communicated to schools, and that
appropriate feedback is provided to Central Office regarding
the functioning, climate and emerging issues within schools
(5%).

7.

Ensures the Ministry is effectively represented in the local
community (5%).

8.

Participates in performance management and professional
development with the Director of Operations (5%).

This list was formulated by two groups of superintendents last year during a
two day retreat at El Caballo Blanco.
public service position data form.
two.

They did so partly by modifying the

The major items are numbers one and

Item one covers the support and audit of schools, as does part of

items four and six.

Two covers the support and appraisal of principals.

The other items collectively add up to as little as one fifth of the
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"The way this is worded, it seems that superintendents don't audit
and review but only set up processes so that they can occur. I'm
not, and never have been, in favour of this document."

39

superintendent's work.

Three and five cover the audit of the district

office referred to on page 18.

The second part of item six covers the

superintendent's role in policy making referred to in Chapter Two.

Seven

and eight are reminders that superintendents work for the centre tier.
On the basis of the superintendents' experience and observations over
the past two and half years, a number of issues can be identified in
relation to their support and audit functions.
those issues.

This chapter outlines

There ls no need to analyse what the functions involve;

that has already been done in the recent Memorandum of Agreement and in
material produced by the Organisation Development Unit.

Also, an even

more detailed set of practical guidelines should emerge from a pilot study
currently being conducted by the Ministry entitled the 'Demonstrating
Accountability Project'.

Internal versus External Review

Superintendents face the problem of having to carry out an auditing
role in a context where, although industrially schools have agreed to
educational auditing, the intellectual argument for that role has still
not been comprehensively won - or understood.

Some principals are not

convinced that external monitoring of their school's performance is
necessary.4

They point out that universities and TAFE colleges have

been allowed to manage themselves but are not made accountable.

They know

that senior high schools in Western Australia before 1987 were excluded
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"Particularly in large secondary schools or with recognised, top
performing principals."
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from triennial inspections by regional superintendents and operated
without external reviews.

They are aware that in Victoria there are no

district superintendents or external audit agencies such as exist in South
Australia, New South Wales, and New Zealand.

They question wnere the push

for educational auditing ls coming from because they have run their
schools for years without complaint from the local community.

And they

believe that while periodic public attacks on levels of literacy and
numeracy may be allayed by the Demonstrating Accountability Project, the
effect of the superintendents' audits will be negligible.

Several

comments by superintendents capture the viewpoint of these principals and
indicate that even among the superintendency there are reservations about
the efficacy and necessity of external auditing.
"Where is the demand for audit coming from? What are we
going to get out of auditing that will reassure the
community? In the past the community never got any more
information than it gets now."
"Provided we produce quality principals and good curriculum
leadership sense, then I don't think we need any greater
assurances about student outcomes."
"Is auditing a straw man? It was redundant for decades.
It's now a fetish. How long will it last?"
Unconvinced principals regard auditing more as a mechanism for managing
change than for increasing community confidence in educational standards.
Consequently they see superintendents, not as agents of public
accountability, but as instruments of centralist control.

For industrial

reasons, these principals will comply with the requirements of educational
auditing, but not wholeheartedly.
confronting superintendents.

That will add to the difficulties

It would help if more was done to win the

intellectual argument for external monitoring and create a climate of
acceptability within which the work of the superintendents could flourish.
For their part, most superintendents accept the need for educational
auditing, even if not unconditionally.
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"I accept audit because it is necessary to give principals
feedback."
"Once the principals are competent and committed to self
evaluation, then the superintendents can withdraw. But
there'll still be the need for accountabllity."
"If we had to choose, 50% of the superintendents would go
for audit and 50% would go for educational leadership. The
old primary superintendents would go for audit because
that's their background and the old subject superintendents
would go for leadership. "!I

"Auditing will be negotiated between superintendents and
principals. It will be a shared thing, collegial. We
always knew that would be our job."
"Auditing doesn't worry me providing I have other jobs like
human relations type things; so long as I'm not an HMI or
just operating from a filing cabinet in the back of the
car."
"Schools have to be audited, but we should do it in a
professional way."
"If we don't audit, then self-determining schools won't
survive."

"I am the agent of accountabllity.
Ministry."

I represent the

School Consultant versus System Auditor

In South Australia and New South Wales, the district superintendent
provides a consultancy service to help schools conduct internal reviews of
their performance.

External reviews of schools are carried out by

independent panels under the leadership of a central education review
unit.

In Western Australia, the external review is conducted by the same

person who helps schools with their internal review - the district
superintendent.

-------------------------------------------------------Responses
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"What about the 30% new superintendents?"
"Wow!!

What an unfounded generalisation."
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Clearly, the West Australian model is cheaper, 6 and it allows for an
educational audit of each school every year.

In South Australia and New

South Wales, schools receive a three day visit by a team of external
reviewers only once every four or five years.

Annual, or even biennial,

visits would require a massive increase in the size of the external review
unit.

Apart from the expense, the sheer size of the expanded unit would

convey overtones of heavy central control. - something inimical to
devolution.
There is another advantage of the West Australian model.

The

integration of consultancy with auditing allows district superintendents
to monitor schools in a more ongoing, developmental, collegial, formative,
and remedial manner than can be achieved by a central audit and review
agency.

Superintendents are aware of these advantages.

"Thirty superintendents accepted the role assuming their
job was more formative than summative. If auditing ls
summative then lt is potentially creating a higher level of
risk because schools will have done things before the
judgements are made and 'preventative medicine' can't be
practised. If you know the history of the patient, then
that collectively ls the audit. It's a lot easier to deal
with little issues if they are dealt with on an ongoing
basis. It's hard to suddenly undo big aggregated issues."
"As data is collected, if it's given to superintendents
progresssively rather than at the end of the year, then
it's better because schools can make adjustments before it
gets to be too late."
"With auditing the school development plan, each visit ls
monitoring. If I'm coming in as a part of ongoing support
and consultation, then the end of year audit is only a
formality."
"To carry out the audit and review role, I'll be ln schools
more. It ls possible to decrease the judgemental and
negative terms by having them negotiated and shared. I'm
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"This ls apparent with the publication of the percentage the W.A.
Government allocates to education; that ls, much less than other
states."
-~/
f

I

I
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there not as a policeman but in a positive supportive role
to help achieve objectives. As a bottom line I might have
to say, 'These problems need addressing.' But there won't
be any surprises and we'll develop common strategies to
address them and use some district resources. It's hard to
convince principals that they stand to gain, not lose, by
this process. However, if someone is not doing the right
thing, then I shouldn't back off, and I can't exclude the
old time hardliners."
The Western Australian model, however, contains a potential danger.

If

superintendents play a consultancy role during the formulation stage of
school development plans, their objectivity may be compromised when it
comes to endorsing them.

A similar concern existed in New Zealand before

1988 because the department's inspectors had advisory and regulatory roles
which were sometimes in conflict.

Evidently an inspector was required to

approve the organisational outline of a school and then inspect that school
and report on its programmes and educational outcomes.

"The same inspector

may also have run in-service training courses or been called upon by the
principal for advice and guidance.

However, the educational outcomes may

have been influenced by deflciences in the inspector's advice or by
weaknesses in the organisation outline she or he approved" (Picot 1988:30).
Individual schools may not see this conflict as being detrimental to
their interests because, unlike appraising principals for merit promotion,
superintendents are not required to rank schools on a graduated scale of
1-5.

Satisfying community demands for accountability, though, is another

matter.

A problem may arise if public and professional confidence in the

auditing process ls weakened by a perception that the superintendent's
objectivity is compromised by having to simultaneously perform "advisory
and regulatory roles."
One way around this conflict is to restrict the superintendent's role to
that of either auditing or providing consultation.

Another is for

superintendents to perform both roles but limit the support function to
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providing principals with information, clarification, and materials on
Ministry policy:
Agreement.

essentially this is the stance taken in the Memorandum of

A third option is to ensure that full consultation with

principals occurs in a fashion that does not leave the superintendent
responsible for the outcome.

For example, according to one superintendent:

"The functions of educational leadership and audit can be a
contradiction - like an accountant auditing his own books.
If I work with a principal to construct a framework to
audit, then I risk basically auditing myself. My problem
was: how could I audit what I'd helped to structure
because there would be a conflict of interests. I would be
disposed to positively audit because a negative audit would
be a condemnation of myself. So I reversed it - principals
made the decisions and had the power. My role was to
influence those decisions. That inverted the usual picture
people had and made me feel better about auditing because
the principal made the decisions. I said, 'You can do it
that way but are you prepared for these consequences'. I
pointed out that they had freedom to choose but not freedom
to choose the consequences. The process of auditing then
became a simple one and was not a conceptual problem of
auditing myself."

Professional Development versus Performance Appraisal

Most superintendents in Western Australia agree that part of their job
is to ensure "the effective performance management of school principals,
including promotion by merit."
Performance management encompasses professional development and
performance appraisal.

Insofar as principals make or break a school, the

level of support they receive and the monitoring of their work have always
been important.

The Better Schools Report bestowed an added sense of

urgency to the delivery of those services.

It made schools the primary

units of change and principals the lynchpin in the new structure.
Consequently the work of superintendents in supervising principals occupies
an important place in the new system.
problems.
/

/

It also presents a number of
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The Picot Report claimed that the role of adviser and the role of
assessing performance can be in conflict and should therefore be conducted
separately.

It argued along these lines.

Superintendents are required to

give advice to principals - but these principals are subsequently visited
by the same superintendent for an appraisal leading to the issue of a
personal report.

Because the personal report is vital to their chances of

winning promotion, principals feel reluctant to admit to deficiences about
their leadership when these concerns could later be reflected in the
personal report made by the superintendent. 7

The less principals

disclose their real difficulties, the less the superintendent can provide
real support.

A number of superintendents alluded to a tension within the

dual role of supporter and assessor.
"The superintendent's role is developmental, not
judgemental - though superintendents will say to a weak
principal, 'Go and pull up your socks, do courses, or we'll
sack you'."
"An adverse report could be used to settle a conflict of
interests with a principal. But if principals know this is
a possibility will they be up front at the beginning in
declaring goals, needs etc at a performance management
interview? Will they take risks or play it safe and not
open up? The old system was a game of hide and seek. The
principals would hide their inadequacies and say to the
inspector, 'Find them if you can'. Now the superintendent
can say to prin,:;·:,::P..ls. 'If you have inadequacies declare
them and I'll heip you, but if you fail I'll have to take
that into account.' In the old system the superintendent
didn't help principals overcome inadequacies."
"There ls a conflict between developing principals and
appraising them. The principal has the same problem with
his staff."
"Superintendents build up the self esteem of principals by
being encouraging and not pointing out weaknesses. If you
are honest at the beginning and tell a principal, 'You're
fairly weak', the principal might lose heart. If you lie
and say 'You're strong', and the principal fails at the
end, then the principal feels misled."

-------------------------------------------------------Responses
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"The smarter ones realise they get 'brownie points' by
successfully solving problems. So a few get set up and
solved very effectively."
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"The principals need pastoral care. Some have poor houses,
wives in Perth, and get sick. 'Phey need the superintendent
for support so in a way I'm the parent of 25-30 kids
principals who need some TLC and who need to be constantly
patted on the back. There needs to be more in the field of
liaison to get to know them. But it's difficult because we
have to write a report on them for promotion and the new
performance management system. That will force
superintendents to relinquish the pastoral care role
because we have to audit the principals. We're human too.
We like the pastoral care role. That's why the Executive
thought of bringing us back to Central Office - so we don't
get too close to the principals, so we can be impartial. 11
Another type of tension can arise when the same person has to be both
supporter and assessor.
principals. 8

Self-determining schools require self-determining

To achieve that objective, the superintendent/principal

relationship must not be chara.cterised by paternalism and dependence.

As

one superintendent explained:
"The old system bred principals who said, 'Tell me what to
do and I'll do it to perfection and therefore aren't I a
good principal'. Under the new system, principals are not
supposed to be told what to do; there are to be no
clones. n
But in practice, the superintendent is still seen as both advisor and
judge.

Consequently,
"Principals ask, 'Give me a list of deficits,' because then
they tick them off and say, 'I'm a top operator,' and they
twist my arm to give the A+ mark. 11

These tensions 9 do not arise if the superintendent/principal
relationship ls collegial, non-threatening, and characterised by openness

Responses

e

"I would argue that a self-determining principal is an obstruction.
Self-determining schools require a principal who can facilitate and
guide the process."
"Self-determining schools do not require self-determining principals.
In fact if we have self-determining principals we may have principals
d~ctating what he/she wants. This is far from the expressed
philosophy of self-determining schools."

9

"Th,, same dichotomy occurs with the performance management of district
sup'erintendents and the directors of operations."
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and trust.

According to performance management ithe.olj,tJiqthat'' type of

relationship can be developed if both parties reach: e,~~!J:r~.ri;~ment on the

·

o,tw

,2;ih ··· •

principal's job goals, performance outcomes, inserviceI;;,,fr.ailhli,rrg1 needs, and
: f<i ;tll)'R i;i:;

the level of support required to meet those needs. ,A:ppr.ais.al then takes
place in terms of outcomes rather than inputs:
~:, '.; jt-f! -~ 'i}t

.--,, :

achieving performance objectives rather than the princ],pJnsf,t',behaviour,
' )<: t'I'<!

personality, or occupational character traits;

: .

or, in ter.msli:P'.1\ ''the

extent to which the principal has been able to raise the·:performance of
the school through effective problem solving rather than wh~t the
• ,

1,,_:;.;

principal actually did" (Organisation Development Unit 1989:9).

In this

way the process of supporting and appraising principals parallels the
process of supporting and auditing schools.
earlier, there is a crucial difference.

However, as me.ntioned

Whereas superintendents only have

to declare the performance of schools to be satisfactory

or · .. '

unsatisfactory, they have to rank the performance of principals. applying
for promotion on a five point scale.

Since the mark makes a significant

difference to an applicant's career prospects, the non-judgemental,
'''f;,

non-threatening nature of the superintendent/principal relationship is
placed at risk.
·\~Jr

~

Lack of time, say the superintendents, also impedes the deyelopment of
a collegial relationship with principals based on openness ~ndtttrust. 10
They consider that a satisfactory performance management programQle for
25-30 principals can not be supervised by one superintendent.
research recommends about eight as the maximum.

Apparently

For that :reason the

superintendents believe directors of operations are able to make
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"Has anyone analysed the amount of time a country dlstrictr
superintendent spends in a vehicle or plane? Often in our .own
time!"

---
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performance management work for them,. though even then there are some
reservations.
"Another part of the cultural change is performance
management based on the public service model: goal
setting, personal development, ascertaining needs in
relation to school development. But it depends on a
superordinate-subordinate relationship of one to five. It
works with the director of operations and seven
superintendents but not with one superintendent and 28
principals."
"The good book say 6-8 maximum. I have to work with 30
principals on performance management."
"Middle management theory says the supervisory ratio should
be 1:8. Superintendents have a ratio of 1:30 schools.
That makes our work superficial and inadequate and it will
remain that way until an alternative has been found."
"I'll be canvassing my own staff and principals for
feedback on my performance. The director of operations
won't have time. He's off site, the same as I'm off site
for the principals."
"The performance management system is new. It won't work
in the true sense however because my director of operations
won't know me well enough. He'll be battling to see me
once in action each year."
The requirement to appraise teachers as well as principals for merit
promotion exacerbates the shortage of time.

There is an expectation among

the superintendency that reforms to the merit promotion system will
relieve them of having to inspect and report on staff other than
principals. and that more of the onus will be placed on applicants to
establish their own case for promotion.
"Last year (1989) one superintendent had more reports to
write than days to do it in. The sets of applications come
in waves. You have to complete one set by a deadline
before the next set comes in. It takes at least a day for
each person who applies. It's okay when assessing
principals because we see them through professional
development but with teachers it's more difficult because
we haven't seen them and we have to verify all the evidence
and claims made."
"Superintendents assess principals applying for promotion.
It's time consuming and lacks comparabUity and
moderation. How my colleagues do lt in another district
I've no idea. We get no feedback from the Promotion
Board'.; How does the Board assess my rating of principals?"
I

r
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"Superintendents can't do both - auditing and merit
promotion of all principals and. teachers. The
superintendents should only write reports on principals.
But if principals did the superintendent's role of writing
reports on teachers then the principal would become
overloaded and would have to be relieved of some duties.
Perhaps no one should write reports and we could do what
the public service does and applicants could· write their ·
own reports."
"The projected percentages are 30% accountability and 5%
promotion by merit. At present the figures are reversed.
I spend 30% on promotion by merit and 5% on
accountability. The number of applications should be
restricted. We need filters and smarter merit promotion
based on a performance management programme."
The tensions that arise when the same person acts in an advisory and
regulatory capacity are not confined to superintendents.11

Some people

argue that they apply equally to the principal/teacher and teacher/pupil
relationships.

However, is the comparison valid?

Are superintendents

supposed to be instructional leaders of principals in the same way that
principals and teachers are for their subordinates?12

Should the

professional development component of performance management· be mandatory,
or, supervised by superintendents only on request from the principals?

If

mandatory, does it then become more an instrument of Central Office
control rather than professional development?

Within a system of self

determining schools, should not principals be allowed - indeed, encouraged
- to choose their own provider of professional development?

-------------------------------------------------------Reapoaaea
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"This 'friend and enemy' distinction does not flt my experience.
The schools accept my dual role. A friend of mine ls in the
central audit unit in New Zealand. She has some grave concerns ·
because with the disappearance of the district superintendent
there is no system support at all for principals."

12

"I question the term 'instructional' rather than 'educational
leadership.' It worries me that if superintendents are seen to
lose their educational expertise they lose their credibility too."
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Principal Perfonnance versus School Perfonnance

Should superintendents assess the performance of principals in terms of
the performance of their schools? 13
fails has the principal failed?

If the school development plan

Those questions divide the

superintendency and the broader educational community.
Advocates for keeping the appraisal of principals and schools separate
ar~ue that principals should not be held accountable for outcomes beyond
their control.

And, they say, the key factors affecting the success of a

school are outside the control of principals.

For instance, principals

have little control over the type of pupils who attend their school and
the quality of teachers apppointed to their staff.

Furthermore they are

stuck with a wide range of centrally determined policies, frameworks, and
regulations that shape the operation and outcomes of their schools.
take a small example:

To

how can principals be held accountable for the

image of their school in the community if regulations prevent them making
school uniforms compulsory?
'Separationists' point out that the complexity of some school
communities makes it very difficult to assess whether the school is
successful or not.

However, they say, that does not prevent the

performance of principals in these schools bt:!ing assessed.

Supervisors

who observe principals in action can rate various aspects of their work
without knowing details of the school's performance.

For instance, the

Ministry's merit promotion application form asks referees to do just

Re•ponaes
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"I don't believe we are assessing. We are auditing the quality
of the planning in the schools to meet the perceived needs.
This includes the audit of the use of resources and the
development of participatory decision making."
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that on a wide range of points under the headings of communication,
decision-making, educational leadership, and management skilis.
'Separationists' also argue that Judging principals by the success of
the school development plan will encourage them to take on an unhealthy
sense of personal ownership of that plan instead of trying to foster
genuine community involvement.

For example, one superintendent said that

in his district, a lot of time was spent during principals' conferences
exploring the notion of performance appraisal and trying to get principals
to see that their role was distinct from the school development plan.
"Some of them, in fact most of them, saw themselves as
being appraised in terms of the success or failure of the
school development plan. If that was the case, it was
logical that they would tend to want the school development
plan to be a statement that they had created and made - in
short, if they were to hang for something, then it had to
be something they wanted to hang for. It became clear to a
lot more of the principals that the school development plan
is a statement made by and belonging to the school and
performance appraisal is about appraising the role that the
principal has in managing the school development plan."
On the other hand, those in favour of appraising principals in terms of
their school's performance argue that assessment should be based on
outputs, not inputs.

If that does not occur then principals will be

judged on the trappings of management rather than on their efficiency and
effectiveness;H

principals will be judged on things like dress, zeal,

industry, and leadership style rather than on whether they are making a
significant difference to the operational performance of the school in
achieving its stated objectives.

That, in turn, could lead to bizarre

judgements equivalent to: "The operation was successful but the patient

-----· --------------------------------------------------Respoaaes
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"You can be fabulously efficient and effective at completing tasks
which are totally irrelevant to the school's purposes. Unless
that is recognised, principals will be Judged on their competency
to carry out tasks rather than their contribution to the stated
educational outcomes of the school" (a reference group member).
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died";

and, "The teacher performed beautifully but the pupils learned

nothing. "1!1

It could lead also to the promotion of those who "look good

rather than produce the goods."
Moreover, the principal is the chief executive officer of the school
and has ultimate on-site responsibility for how well the school is doing.
As such, he or she can not escape the requirement that, "Those who
exercise pQwer and responsibility on behalf of others must expect to have
their performance monitored and be accountable for what they have
achieved" (Picot 1988:60).

Accountability here does not mean being

subjected to judgemental assessment or being held responsible for factors
outside the principal's control.
happened.

It means being able to account for what

It means being able to show that decisions to improve a

school's performance were made in a rigorous fashion - that is, "based on
proper monitoring, with appropriate benchmarks, following a collaborative
problem solving process, and with due regard to Ministry policy"
(Organisation Development Unit 1989:3).

In other words, accountability

does not mean assessing how well schools solve problems but how they go
about generating strategies to solve their problems - a process for which
principals can legitimately be held responsible.

Thus, say some

superintendents:

Respoaaes

1!1

"True up to a point. But it begs questions. The operation on
the bowel for the removal of a cancerous growth was immaculate
and successfully achieved. Unfortunately the patient died ·Of a
massive stroke. That is not a bizarre judgement. It's a fact.
I guess the point is to distinguish between that which a
principal/teacher can and cannot be held accountable for. I
have trouble seeing how a teacher performing beautifully could
have a class full of kids who learned nothing. Even a teacher
performing badly can be credited with teaching kids something even if it's all negatives"

I
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"Performance management of principals, and school
development plan support, complement each other; they
can't be done in isolation. The principals know I'm
appraising them all the time."
"You can't divorce principal appraisal from school
appraisal.
"Auditing has introduced another card into the pack.
Principals now get brownie points for making mistakes, for
being up front with the problem and showing they know how
to solve it."
"If outcomes haven't changed, the superintendent doesn't
declare the school inefficient but encourages the school to
question the method of getting there. That could be
compromised by principals seeking merit promotion; that
is, principals could see failure of school outcomes as
being judged as failure as a principal."

Secondary versus Primary Schools

Most superintendents consider that their support and review roles are
more difficult to carry out in secondary than in primary schools.
Tradition is partly responsible here.

Under the pre-1987 structure,

senior high schools had little to do with the regional offices.

The

secondary principals tended to deal directly with the Director General and
the Director of Schools while the senior masters operated through the
subject superintendents from Head Office.

It was the primary schools that

used the regional resources and were triennially inspected by the
superintendents.
"Primary principals objected to the extra duties mainly
because of the fear of being found wanting. They weren't
worried about the workload. It was the anxiety of being
incompetent because they were dependent on the regional
superintendent and were constrained and the superintendents
shouldered the responsibility. Now they are seeing they do
have freedom and they are less resistant to being audited
than secondary principals."
"The secondary principals were not accountable because they
had no triennial inspections. They did their own thing."
"The senior high schools buck more because they are not
used to it."
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"Previously senior high school principals had direct access
to the Director General. They were disdainful to subject
superintendents. Some senior high school principals are
still anti-superintendents because they doubt our
expertise."
During the early '80s, secondary generalist superintendents were
appointed to regional offices.

Apparently, they made little impact

because their role was less defined, understood, and accepted than the
primary superintendents.

According to a reference group member:

"When

the secondary generalist superintendents were appointed no one knew what
they were going to do.

They had to eke out a role for themselves.

One of

them told me that they were roving confidants for first year teachers.
They would roll up to a school, announce their presence, and wait for
teachers to come and talk to them.
active.

Their role should have been more

The district superintendent role is a bit like a grander

secondary generalist superintendent."

The present superintendents would

agree with some, if not all of that statement.
"The notion of the generalist superintendent - secondary,
was introduced and seen as equivalent to primary
superintendents but its relationship to the subject
superintendents was never defined. It was a nebulous pot."
"The secondary generalist superintendent came out about
1980-1. No one seemed to know their role. They felt a
sense of frustration in that teachers felt they owed their
loyalty to subject superintendents - they had the power and
expertise."
The current district structure does little to attract the interests of
secondary schools.
some as few as one.

Most districts have only a few senior high schools and
Therefore, secondary principals often find district

principals' conferences less collegial and relevant than do their primary
counterparts.•'

-------------------------------------------------------Reapoaaea
1,

"Jn country districts, secondary principals are newly promoted and
I
/ eager for training."
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Senior high schools have less need for superintendents to monitor their
performance than is the case with primary schools;

they have inbuilt

auditing mechanisms in the form of TEE results and SEA subject moderation
and certification.11
Secondary schools are large, less child-centred, and more fragmented by
subject departments.

Those characteristics hq,ve impeded progress on

school development in the past.

For example, a reference group member

pointed out that, "Secondary generalist superintendents were based on the
notion that there was an entity about a school and their role was to help
find and enhance that entity.

The problem was most secondary schools

didn't have a distinct entity, they only had subject entities."

Similar

comments were made by the superintendents.
"The primary schools were used to being treated as a school
as a whole. They put up no resistance to school
development because they were on the verge of getting it in
place. The secondary schools are fragmented because the
different faculties make it hard to get school vision,
purpose, priorities. They used to be funded direct from
Head Office."
"The high schools are behind on school development compared
with the primary schools. They used to have subject
superintendents. Now they say the district office staff
don't provide much. We have 7 .5 staff, of whom only 4.5
are directly available to schools, so we can't match what
they used to have."
For a number or reasons, superintendents have more difficulty
establishing their credentials in senior high schools.

Secondary

principals tend to have higher status in the community and more subject

-------------------------------------------------------Responses

11

"Only for Upper School.

What about Years 8-10?"

"I doubt the efficacy of this. What careful analysis is done? By
whom? With what results? Even the data can be rationalised away
given a close knowledge of the events."
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. specialist academic qualifications than their primary counterparts.

They

are less convinced that superintendents can offer much in the way of
relevant experience and expertise - particularly when the superintendents
are recruited from primary backgrounds. 18

This is not to say that

superintendents accept that judgement.
"High schools think they are superior because they are
larger, have more money, and kids doing Year 12 exams.
They have a nonchalent, superior manner, and large egos,
and see themselves as the most important cog in the
system. They can affect the culture of the district."
"I haven't any high school subject expertise but I have
process skills and management expertise so I don't have any
conflicts or hang ups about going into secondary schools."
"The only way to keep in touch with high schools is to sit
in with subject departments. I'll go to fortnightly social
studies meetings at (. .... ) senior high school to find out
how a faculty gets access to the school grant and fits in
with school priorities. But this is not a big point. I
have more difficulty keeping in touch with the Ministry."
"I go into classrooms for teacher morale purposes - to
provide teachers with the link they believe they lost;
that is, someone other than the principal to discuss their
own performance and aspirations with. This only happens at
the primary level; I get into every primary classroom but
never below the level of senior teachers in high schools."
"The power of the superintendent has changed from overt to
infiuential. The span of control has increased. It goes
from K-12. In the old days it was from 1-7. That tests
one's credibility, particularly for primary superintendents
when they talk with senior high school principals. Because
of our lack of expertise we have to shut up. "te

iteaPoDaea
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"Generally this is true. But it depends a lot on the district
superintendent's style. There is a district
superintendent/secondary school agenda; the district
superintendent has to define it and be assertive."
"I disagree. I have a totally primary background but find high
schools are ready to discuss their development and the planning
process."

/
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Closing Comment

Clearly, the role of the superintendent can vary according to how the
issues outlined in this chapter are resolved.

Further variation will

occur if the issues are settled on a district by district basis rather
than in a way that applies uniformly across the board.

That raises the

question of how the interests of a system of self determining schools are
best served on this matter - by variation or by uniformity?

Two

superintendents gave answers to that question.
"At least in the initial stage I would suspect that
variation was the way to go. Perhaps the time is now ripe
for some uniformity."
"Both will exist. Variation will exist because of
interpersonal links and variations in superintendent/
principal relationships. Uniformity will exist in terms
of: audit and review happening, time-lines, Ministry
policy and directives, compliance with Memorandum of
Agreement implementation, and references to common
'standard' goals."
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CHAPTER FIVE

CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TIERS

Ideally, a system of self-determining schools is characterised by unity
within diversity.

That is, all schools accept a basic minimum set of

centrally determined core values, goals, and priorities, but beyond that
they exercise freedom to develop their own structures and sub-cultures.
When those conditions prevail, Central Office and schools work in harmony
with each other and a two tier system becomes pluralistic rather than
monolithic in nature.
Over the past three years in Western Australia relations between the
two tiers have not always been marked by mutual trust, respect, and
support.

Instead of peaceful co-existence there have been significant

periods of suspicion, rancour, and conflict.
historical, industrial, and ideological.

The bases of the discord are

They bring into question the

possibility of ever reaching the ideal of unity within diversity.

They

also make certain demands upon the role of the superintendent.

Historical Basis of Division

No one should have been surprised by the radical reforms proposed in
the Better Schools Report.
leading up to 1987.

They were clearly foreshadowed in the events

The press for school-based declsion-making groups had

been fostered by the Australian Schools Commission during the '70s, the·
Teachers Union campaign for democratic decision making in the '80s, the
Beazley Report in 1984, and the Education Department pilot studies on

/
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community participation in 1985.

The progression towards full scale merit

promotion began in the early '80s and was pushed along by the Beazley
Report.

The same can be said for principals determining the permanency of

new teachers.

During the l 980's, Annual Reports of the Education

Department announced moves to promote more corporate management.
first restructuring of Head Office took place in 1986.

The

The well

publicised work of the Functional Review Committee in reorganising other
departments began in 1984.

The blueprint for modernizing all government

departments, 'Managing Change in the Public Sector', was published in
1986.

And most of the 1985-6 editions of The Western Teacher and The W.A.

Education News contained accounts of plans to introduce the new directions
for schools announced in the Better Schools Report.
Yet, when the Better Schools Report was released, many people in the
education system felt ambushed and violated.

They accused the management

of hatching the Report in secrecy, failing to consult with the rank and
file, and deliberately releasing the Report while teachers were away on
Christmas holidays.
outrage.

One event in particular caused deep dismay and

Immediately prior to the release of the report, some 75

superintendents were addressed at a meeting in Central Office, told that
their permanency had been revoked, and informed that at the end of the
year they would have to apply in open competition for jobs in the new
structure.

The move was widely condemned as an entirely inappropriate way

to treat officers who had served the Department loyally for many years.
Rumours that subject seniors in high schools and principals might meet
with a similar fate added to the anger.

Furthermore, school staff were

incensed by what they saw as the politicisation and corporatisation of
their system, the hypocrisy of introducing bottom up reforms by top down
edicts, and the imposition of new duties without the provision of adequate
resources.

In short, the manner in which the radical restructuring took
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place in 1987 seriously injured relations between the schools and Central
Off\ce.
During 1988 and '89, this division between the two tiers hijacked the
role of the superintendents.

Instead of focussing on quality control,

they became agents of damage control.

A:; the front line Ministry officers

in the field they served as punching bags, absorbing the anger of people
who hit out against the Central Office.

Much of their time was spent

trying to defuse discontent, present schools with the human face of the
Ministry, and repair the cracks in trust.

The superintendents also

functioned as apologists for the system.

They had to.

The rationale for

radical change presented in the Better Schools Report was limited to a one
page set of bald assertions.

Not surprisingly, when superintendents

decribe their work they make comments such as:
"The district superintendent's role is one of team building
and damage control of morale at all levels."
"The superintendent's major role is to fix the bridges that
have been destroyed. We have to explain to the principals
why the Ministry has made changes and convince them that it
is good. It's hard."
"Lately we've been told by our directors of operations that
we have to show teachers the Ministry does care. But
superintendents can't really do this, the Ministry has to
do it.
"If superintendents become just auditors, who will assure
teachers. that the Ministry cares?"

"All the explanations since 1987 have been about what was
going to happen, not why it was going to happen. There was
no attempt to win the hearts."
"An early lesson for me was that I was expected to explain
and support Central Office policies and plans when I had no
input to these and very little understanding of them and no
professional development to do the work. I waited,
searched for more information, contacted more people. I
think the principals in the district felt disadvantaged
because they were not up-to-date as quickly as others."
"There is no reality to auditing; it's a dreamworld. We
have to be totally capable of living with ambivalence.
Central Office just doesn't know. The principals and
teachers hatred of Central Office is real and interesting."
(

/

61

"I'm aware of the gap between me and the schools.
buyers' resistance to change out there."

There is

"Many of the new 29 metro superintendents have paid the top
price for the System's inept implementation of massive
changes. In schools, 'Better Schools' is associated with
'blood on the toga' and the career ambitions of
non-educationists in Central Office."
What made this reconciliatory role heavy work for some superintendents
was that they themselves had serious reservations about the way the
reforms took place.

The reservations do not end there.

They extend to

some current Central Office practices and standpoints.
"Philosophically I'm in favour of direction. I don't think
any major, long term strategic grand plan has been set up
by the Ministry. It is just groping its way forward. The
Ministry spouts forward planning as the preferred practice,
but it Just hasn't been happening. There is a gap between
rhetoric and reality. It's 'do as I say, not do as I do'
which decreases the effectiveness of the change. The
Ministry is not practising what it preaches. It's still a
top down process. Better Schools is in its fourth year now
and there is nothing radically new."
"I have to be honest with principals. If I protect the
Central Office against poor methodology then I lose an
investmment. For example, the release of news of the new
Chief Executive Officer. We could have been told about it
at the senior officers' meeting. Instead we read about it
in the press the next morning. If we protect the Ministry
then a 'them and us' attitude will develop and principals
will lose confidence."
"My view is more cautious. I get less excited because I've
seen the politics and the Ministry's rhetoric. I'm not
cynical, just a hardened veteran. I've been through lots
of changes. I realise how difficult changing a
bureaucratic organisation is. The future of the Ministry
is no where as likely to happen as readily as some people
might suggest. When people say, 'This is the grand plan,
this is the vision' I temper that - we'll never reach it.
"My experience in curriculum change scenarios is that
change requires a change in the way people perceive
things. Unless you get to people's hearts and minds and
start explaining how they win from participating in a new
system, unless that is done first, then any change is
shallow and short lived.
"Superintendents are locked into a role which is a
reflection of poor change implementation by Central
Office. The resources were not looked at nor were the
industrial expectations."
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"2000 years of experience walked out the door three years
ago."
"The perceived sacking of loyal and competent
superintendents is part of the organizational folklore.
This scepticism is also on the current superintendents'
informal discussion agendas. This weakens the
organisation."
"The Ministry is trying to effect changes in the processes
and structures before changing values and attitudes and
personal perceptions. They haven't been addressed because
of naiveity and political expediencies. There have been a
lot of junior people involved in the change planning.
"The Executive never workshopped the Better Schools Report
with us. The senior officers need a residential two day
course on the philosophy behind it to develop greater
commitment. n
"The idea of the Better Schools Report was to de-resource
Central Office. But in practice Central Office hasn't been
streamlined. There is still centralist thinking and
influence on professional development, the school
development operation, and industrial areas - the Human
Resources Directorate are preventing changes occurring."
With the passing of time, it is possible that the wounds will heal and
changes in the organisation's culture will catch up to the structural
reform.

When that stage is reached, the superintendents will no longer be

required to play the role of shock absorber, punching bag, system
apologist, corporate missionary, damage controller, and agent of deep
coping.

Industrial Basis or Division

One source of division between the two tiers that is unlikely to
, disappear with the passing of time is the conflict of interests that
traditionally exists between management and labour.

Central Office

executives, directors, and managers are judged by the Ministry's level of
productivity in relation to the level of resources available.

That

applies particularly in times of economic rationalism when added

I
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importance is attached to efficiency and effectiveness, and when new needs
have to be met not by increasing resources but by redistributing existing
ones.

For school staff, resource restructuring should mean different

work, not extra work.

Different work, however, is often seen by staff as

constituting a threat to their interests, particularly if it involves
retraining and the risk of failure - without any compensatory rewards.
For much of the time, the inherent conflict of industrial interests
between the two tiers lies dormant.

Last year {1989) in Western Australia

it erupted into a statewide dispute.

On a smaller scale, industrial

unrest can occur within an individual school over matters such as
replacing asbestos roofs.

Moreover, conflict does not always directly

involve teaching staff - disputes can arise between Central Office and
groups such as school cleaners.
Generally, the superintendents are not required to play a conciliatory
role during disputes between Central Office and schools.

So far they have

been largely, though not entirely, side-lined by both groups.

To some

extent it has been recognised that any involvement by them would
compromise their credentials to provide principals with collegial support
upon settlement of the conflict. 1

On the other· hand, superintendents do

experience discomfort during disputes.
their role.

In some cases, they are unsure of

In other -cases they find themselves the meat in the sandwich.

"I investigated some Ministry phone calls about principals
during industrial unrest and I had to tell some principals
they'd got it wrong. But I didn't influence or victimize
anyone. I didn't push the party line. I allowed a
conscience vote. 11
1 sat in the staffroom (of a school) during a union
meeting. I was invited to stay as an observer. Some
superintendents would not have received that invitation. 11
11

Responses

1

A bit weak. It's more because we have no power in decisions on
these matters (settling disputes) and everyone knows that. 11

11
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"The schools and Union said, 'We are not part of the
Ministry.' The directors of operations and Central Office
said, 'We are part of the Ministry.' The superintendents
had to tread a delicate line - gently. They made it clear
where they stood but left the principals alone. And most
principals didn't go out of their way to make it into a
confrontation with the superintendents. So after it was
over, it was easier for superintendents and principals to
come together because neither made the other side difficult
during the dispute."
"The principals wanted to know, 'Are you on our side or the
Ministry's side'?"
" 'Whose side are you on?' That came out in the strike a
lot. We were the meat in the sandwich. Central Office
expected corporate loyalty from us and said, 'You are the
employer's representative in the field and you will send in
notes of who doesn't attend meetings'."
"In 1989, teachers united with principals against the
common enemy. This year they are challenging principals."
"The cleaners dispute was a crisis time. No direction
comes from Central Office about what role superintendents
play in these times. Should superintendents visit schools
and give moral support? Do I have a role talking to
teachers about the cleaners strike? The directors of
operations should give superintendents advice on these
things. I didn't want Central Office endorsement. I Just
wanted helpful advice. I had to rely on gut level
intuition. We're constantly thinking on our feet in this
job and negotiating our role because there is no history to
it."

Ideological Basis of Division

To the extent that a centralized, authoritarian, paternalistic system
of educational administration produces dependence and conformity, there is
little tension between the centre and the schools.

To the extent that a

corporate management structure is based on a recentralization/
decentralization dualism, it contains the ingredients for continual
conflict between the two tiers.
Ideologically, the conflict between schools and the Central Office can
be conceptualised in several forms.

It can be seen as the outcome of

attempts to strike a balance between general dichotomies such as:
',
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freedom
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versus authority, independence versus conformity, and needs of the
individual versus needs of the state.

It can spring from the two tiers

having different opinions on the composition of the common core of values,
goals and priorities that Central Office sets for schools.

It can take

the form of schools disagreeing with Central Office over what counts as
being inconsistent with Ministry policy and regulations.

It can result

from some schools interpreting self-determination as complete autonomy and
resenting any interference from outsiders - particularly Central Office.
According to superintendents,
"Fifty percent of the principals say, 'Disband the district
office and give us the money.' They don't want anyone
challenging them. They are authoritarian."
"Some principals want to be totally autonomous.
even want the Ministry."

They don't

"Schools are not autonomous and never can be. The
Executive overstated the case. It gave the wrong
impression to schools. Schools are only self-determining
in how they will go about things but even then within
constraints like industrial agreements - and rulings on
things like school uniforms and teaching English."
In relation to this constant struggle, superintendents are agents of
the centre, not the schools.

As such they have the task ·or ensuring that

conflict is resolved in a way that does not compromise the Ministry's
definition of the situation.

At the same time they have a responsibility

to encourage schools to be self-determining.

The result, as one

superintendent observed, is that:
"Superintendents have to identify acceptable shades of
grey. We are moderators and have the authority to say,
'That is acceptable and that ls unacceptable.' Almost
weekly, principals challenge our authority to intervene on
a range of things. And each week I have to counsel a
principal on the wisdom of his judgement on day to day
management decisions which in themselves are not major
educational decisions but which collectively could be
disastrous if not checked.
The alternative ls to have detailed regulations, but
these wouldn't allow for discretion and shades of grey the world isn't that simple, it's not black and white. The
grey nature of human relationships means that boundaries
are always shifting on personal and local issues. We need

66

to make judgements relative to cases. We need to identify
the range of tolerance. If a principal steps outside the
range of tolerance and there is an adverse reaction, the
superintendent has to make a decision. The
superintendent's role is concerned with monitoring and
testing the shades of grey."

Closing Comment

The work of superintendents would be easier if the divisions referred
to in this chapter did not exist.

And that would be the case if most

people in Central Office had their wish.
the state education system.

They take a consensus view of

They believe there is no inherent conflict of

interest between the two tiers or between groups within each tier.

They

say to schools, "We are all the Ministry, the Ministry is all of us, there
is no Them and Us. "2

However, those are statements of a preferred

position rather than statements of social reality.

The fact is that many

people, in schools believe the Ministry ls Central Office.3

They believe

that institutionalised differences in power, rewards, and opportunities
within the system make some members feel less valued than others.

In

their view as long as these differences exist, individuals and groups will
be divided not only by unequal conditions but also by unequal loyalty and
commitment.

Or, as several superintendents said:

"The issue of c-orporate identity and the 'them and us'
mentality will remain a problem until people in Central
Office realise that they work in the Central Office of the
Education Ministry and not in the Education Ministry."

R88PoD888

2

"The Ministry consists of three parts - Central Office, district
offices, and schools. I believe that schools are the most
important part of the Ministry, certainly not Central Office or
district offices."

a

"So do people in Central Office."
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"The politics of a bureaucracy the size of ours involves
'knowledge as power' still. This keeps alive: the belief
that things still run top down because all the knowledge is
in Central Office; field personnel feeling subservient to
and dependent on Central Office; and the conviction that
little in the field is important or relevant to the
direction setting and policy creation of the system. Maybe
this is a set of perceptions felt more keenly · by country .
personnel."
One response to these divisions would be to to allow schools to opt out
of the system and sever links with Central Office so that the two tiers
would not be forced into conflict with each other.

Another approach is to

accept constant tension between the two tiers as an inevitable fact of
life and temper expectations about removing it accordingly;

and, as one

superintendent said, "use the conflict as a means of producing alternative
possible solutions."
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CHAPTER SIX

THE SUPERINTENDENT'S POWER IN RELATION TO PRINCIPALS

"In fact, superintendents are the prime agents of change.
If I hadn't pushed and said, 'I'm coming back to check,'
then there would have been no change. Eighty percent of
change comes from the superintendents and the district
office, not the principals."
"A significant number of principals have some intent on
changing but they'll acquiesce rather than value change
scenarios. They don't value the direction of the change or
they have reservations about it to not actively foster it."
"Some principals buck the system and knock the employer.
They have no corporate loyalty and have negative opinions
of their employer. They see us as pro employer."
"In the (. ..... .) district there is a distillation. We
have very experienced principals. Some are resistant to
change. My challenge is to convince them of the value of
the new system. Some of those who are very critical have
nothing to lose because they are over 60 years old. But I
can't wait for two years for them to retire because a
similar aged person might replace them, so we have to
change the mechanisms in the school."
"Many principals who applied for district superintendent
positions and failed were suspicious of the new breed and
determined not to accept line management and their
authority in it."

Superintendents are agents of change and control.

Without their work

with principals it ls questionable whether the reforms outlined in the
Better Schools Report would ever be achieved. 1

Once those reforms have

Responses
1

"In my district 80% of change comes from the young upward mobile
principals."
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been put in place, the superintendent's role as change agent will become
more one of system maintenance - unless a further radical restructuring is
introduced.

The control role is endless.

It involves protecting hard won

gains and ensuring quality control - that is, assuring the highest levels
of performance, whatever stage of organisational development the system is
at.
According to Stoner, Collins, and Yetton, quality control entails four
steps:

establishing standards and methods for measuring performance;

measuring the performance;
standards;

determining whether performance matches

and taking corrective action if performance falls short of

standards - by either changing the activities or changing the standards.
The last step is important because unless superintendents see the control
process through to its conclusion, "they are merely monitoring performance
rather than exercising control.

The emphasis should always be on devising

constructive ways to bring performance up to standard, rather than merely
identifying past failures" (1985:728).

The superintendent's job is not to

personally carry out those four steps in each school.

Rather, it is to

ensure that each school carries them out effectively for itself.

Responses to organisational change

The amount of power superintendents need to function effectively as
agents of change and control depends on how much resistance they face from
principals.

That, in turn, depends on how principals react to the new

responsibilities which a system of self-determining schools places upon
them.

Conceivably, their responses could range from complete rejection to

complete acceptance.

In fact, using those extremes as end points of a

continuum, at least four ideal types of principals can be identified,
namely:

active opponents, passive dissenters, pragmatists, and system
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supporters.

"Briefly and broadly, the characteristics of each ideal

type 2 can be outlined as follows.
Active opponents attack the new system by criticising and complaining
about it in whatever forums are available to them "'."" staffrooms,
principals' associations, political parties, community organisations,
informal networks, the mass media, and professional journals.

Their

approach entails obstructing the implementation of the reforms,
undermining public confidence in the new order, and mobilizing support for
a return to the old system.
Passive dissenters are also comprehensively opposed to the extra duties
assigned to principals, but they are not prepared to engage in either open
or guerilla warfare against the changed order.

Instead, they withdraw to

the sidelines and, wherever possible, pursue a policy of non-involvement.
Their resistance, then, takes the form of refusing to publicly endorse the
reforms, taking no initiative to make the new process work, and having to
be led or carried every step along the road to 'self-determination'.

With

them, it is a case of devaluing organisational change by treating it with
studied indifference.
Pragmatists share some of the active opponent and passive dissenters'
reservations about the new responsibilities assigned to principals;

at

the same time they accept that some change is inevitable and desirable.
Therefore they are prepared to cooperate with the management provided they
are given scope to be role-makers rather than simply role-takers.

This

means the negotiation of concessions about the number of extra duties to
be carried out and the style in which they are performed.

2

Ideal types are abstractions from reality that are based on
observations of concrete instances but are "not designed to
correspond exactly to any single empirical observation (Theodorson,
G.A. and A.G. ( 1969), A Modern Dictionary of Sociology, Barnes and
NoJ>le, New York, p.193.)

/'

/'
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System supporters are committed to making a success of selfdetermining schools.

They do everything the management asks of them

wlllingly, wholeheartedly and enterprisingly.

They defend the new sytem

against attack, 'talk up' its strengths in appropriate forums, and
generally convey optimism about the future outcomes of the changes.
Only four ideal types have been outlined above;

there are others. 3

Also, in reality there are variations within any one type.

For example,

some passive dissenters may occupy a point on the continuum close to that
of the active opponents, while others may be more appropriately placed
near the pragmatists. 4

Reasons for different responses

Why do principals react differently to the same set of extra
responsibilities?

Two factors account for a lot of the variation;

self

interest and ideology.
A common reaction to organisational change by principals, and indeed
any one else affected, is to ask, "What's in it for me?
gain or lose?"

Do I stand to

Principals opposed to self-determining schools are likely

to be those who lack faith in their ability to handle the extra
responsibilities involved.

For them, the new order represents a threat to

job security. Job success, and Job satisfaction;

they see it as reducing

Re8POlll81

3

"I think this section on Responses to Organisational Change is a
bit glib ........ sorry. It seems too superficial and too
selective because it is a huge topic which could warrant another
paper."

4

"Others change their position almost on a dally basis.
not even on the scale" (a reference group member).

Others are
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their prospects of promotion and as being simply more work, more worry,
and a waste of their time and effort.

System supporters, on the other

hand, are likely to be principals who believe that their interests will be
enhanced by the reforms.

From their viewpoint, self-determining schools

offer increased opportunities for career advancement, professional
autonomy, and personal achievement.

Moreover, system supporters are

inclined to have confidence in their ability to capitalize on those
opportunities.
Another type of question that a principal is likely to ask about
radical change is this:

"Will self-determining schools do more good than

harm to the education of pupils and to the well-being of the community?"
The answers to this question will vary because principals have different
sets of beliefs, or ideologies, about what constitutes a good education
system.

Clearly, principals who answer the question in the affirmative

will be inclined to provide system support.

A negative answer, on the

other hand, will point principals in the direction of active opposition"
(Chadbourne 1989:64-55).

Superintendents' Power

When combatting resistance to change and development, superintendents
can employ two types of power:

force and legitimacy.

Force involves

pulling rank (formal authority) backed up by the threat or application of
sanctions.!!

It can have some effect on self interest, but not on

-------------------------------------------------------Responses

!I

"Sanctions were talked about a lot in '87 but have not been
discussed or mentioned of late. There are no sanctions other than
under the regs (old system!)."
"I don't use this at all.
9lfferent in the city."
·'I

/'

I haven't needed to.

I'm told it's
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ideology.

That is, in the face of force, principals are likely to see

that it ls in their interests to comply with what the superintendent
wants.

It is far less certain that they can be forced to change their

ideology.

When it comes to winning hearts and minds, legitimacy is

required.

Poree

The superintendents gave varied accounts of how much formal authority
they have.

For instance, some said they did have authority to direct

principals, whereas others said they could only make suggestions or
recommendations.
"Industrial disputes have held up most issues like school
development plans. Hence we can't direct yet."
"If schools are not complying with Ministry policy, the
action is very clear."
"District superintendents have considerable authority.
This is vested in the audit and policy function."
"If the school development plan guidelines are not complied
with, the superintendents can direct principals to do it.
Some superintendents have wanted to intervene but are not
sure whether the system would support them, or they ring up
the director of operations to double check because there is
no clear policy."

"Superintendents can direct principals - it's in the
regulations."
"The power of superintendents? Very little. We can't
direct. We do the groundwork and the director of
operations then directs the principals. I provide
counselling but the principal can choose to ignore my
suggestions. I could ask the director of operations to
direct but it would take a long time before anything was
achieved. The superintendents superintend and the
directors direct."
"A major reason for tension between principals and district
superintendents is that some superintendents have attempted
to operate very much in an audit role almost from the
outset. Some claim to move from school to school 'auditing
and approving school development plans.' And this was done
well before the emergence of the policy statement
concerning school development plans and obviously well
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before the Memorandum. No .wonder
bit ordinary. Some of the directors
to wear some of this difficulty too.
been instructing superintendents to

relationships have been a
of operations may ·need
They may well have
operate in this way."

Several steps can be taken to add to the authority of superintendents.
One is to publish a clear statement of the directive powers that they do
have.

Another is to publish a more comprehensive set of policies that can

be referred to when their counsel is questioned by principals.

More

broadly:
"The power of the superintendents depends on four
conditions being present: interpersonal skills such as
negotiation, conflict resolution, problem solving; a
framework of policies so the system knows what is expected
of it; line management relationships defined and practised
as defined; and superintendents need authority. "6 (How
many of those are in place?] "Professional development for
superintendents is not fully in place; in fact principals
get more professional development than superintendents.
The policies are coming very slowly, two or three years
after they're needed. Line management - that is frequently
forgotten by the Ministry in terms of some major strategies
9entral Office is planning; for example, professional
development programmes and communication - the Executive
meets more frequently with principals' associations than
with the superintendents. Authority is provided when the
first three empower the superintendents."
Theoretically, if principals refuse to comply with legitimate requests,
then superintendents can apply a number of sanctions.
superintendent could:
Office;

For example, a

send an adverse report on a principal to Central

make a negative recommendation in relation to promotion;

to approve the school development plan;
facilities, and equipment;
functions;

refuse

deny resources, services,

reject invitations to attend school

withhold support if trouble arises with parents, staff,

students, and the local community;

and refuse to endorse applications for

-------------------------------------------------------Responses
&

"Many superintendents have the first three - but this ls often
neg~ted by the fourth which is very powerful."
I

:.'/
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special leave, projects, funds, jobs outside the system, and transfers
within the system.

With the exception of merit promotion reports, such

sanctions are rarely applied. 7

And even with promotions,

superintendents feel they have lost some power.

For example:.

"In the old days I'd write a little screed on principals
seeking merit promotion. Then all the names would be put
on the board and the superintendents would gather around
and sort out the pecking order. 8 The superintendents
had power then. They've lost that now. Now it's done
independent of superintendents who write a big screed on
applicants."
"We haven't got the dollar we used to have. We can't enter
into staffing arrangements. In the old days my opinion on
promotion was sought and all transfers came across my
desk. Now it is more clinical. The schools go straight
through to Central Office. "9
"The superintendent has no decision making power except
executive support from the district office staff. The only
bit of power left is the power to distribute support."
"We have no financial clout. The Executive got rid of
superintendents' discretionary funds. There are more
committees formed to distribute resources like minor
works. The special promotion system used to give
superintendents more clout."
"We can't withold resources because that would punish the
school, it would hurt the school community. It's what I
call biting your bum."
"Any principal wanting promotion is civilised and less
antagonistic towards Central Office."
"We only have clout with principals seeking promotion."

Responses

1

"Are you sure? I believe that quite often minor works
applications, requests for support on funding matters, etc., are
decided on the basis of a 'disagreement with the superintendent',
though legitimate excuses are always found to substantiate refusal"
(a reference group member).

e

"This system was not always fair and it was an exclusive club,
making career decisions."

9

"Is the superintendency about power or something more important educating kids?"
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"Using adverse reports is heavy stuff. And a case could go
on for two years because the battle lines would be drawn."
"We could write an adverse report, but as an absolute last
resort because of the human element. We always hope
something else will work."
"You can use the director of operations but that is similar
to adverse reports - the principal can run to the union."
"A lot of principals get away with murder because we can't
take a hard line because of a lot of changes. It was
easier under the old centralized system to get short term
success and employ sanctions."
On the positive side, and in addition to recommending promotion, the
superintendents referred to two forms of rewards at their disposal:10
"You've got the gen, the good oil. You're the bearer of
good or bad tidings. You have privileged information.
Principals love the gossip. They will keep on the right
side to get the good oil. "11
"Each superintendent is given a budget to offer principals
private and confidential personal development. That
increases the power and credibility of superintendents."
Several measures could be taken to increase the range of sanctions
available to superintendents and reduce their reluctance to apply them.
One is to place all principals on fiv.e year contracts and make them
renewable subject to a positive recommendation from the superintendent.
At present, for all practical purposes, principals not applying for
promotion are untouchable.

Another measure is to limit the

Responses

10

"This is the salvation of the role. If only we could negotiate
rewards with principals based on performance management criteria
we would have all the 'power' we need. A holiday in Fiji? Why
not? A conference in Thailand? Why not? But only for the
achievers, as judged by the district superintendents."

11

"Principals often know before superintendents do."
"Generally, principals have more 'gossip' than us through a very
effective network."
_:.,
·r

/

/'

77

superintendents' role to that of auditing schools and principals.12

As

long· as superintendents feel required to provide principals with support,
they will be reluctant to impose sanctions.

The underlying concern is that

punitive action might adversely affect the type of collegiality necessary
for effective professional counselling.

A third measure is to form a

superintendents institute to combat the moral and political force of the
principals associations. 13

Superintendents would be more confident about

applying sanctions if they knew they had the collective support of their
colleagues.

Legitimacy

Legitimacy is the alternative to force.

Superintendents possess

legitimacy when they have authority in the eyes of the principals, when
they are granted the right by principals to act as supervisors.

In terms

of superintendent/principal relations, the system can bestow authority on
superintendents but not legitimacy - only principals can do that.
Superintendents who have been granted legitimacy are in a position to
gain the cooperation of principals through persuasion and respect rather
than by pulling rank or employing sanctions.

Legitimacy enables

superintendent111 to get a fair hearing from principals - it permits reason
to prevail.

In extreme cases, though, legitimacy may allow unquestioning

acceptance of what the superintendent says, out of deference for either the
person or the position.

Reapoaaea

12

"Where would the trust be then?

Them and Us would be entrenched."

13

"This idea of principals associations being a threat doesn't hold."
"This support base needs to be established."
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Expertise is one basis of legitimacy.
sufficient.

Actually having expertise is not

Principals must perceive that superintendents possess it.

most cases real ability shines through.

In

However, the superintendents feel

that principals' perceptions of them are sometimes based on stereotypes.
In some instances lack of formal qualifications, no school administrator
experience, and being female were seen as barriers to legitimacy.
"Superintendents with no paper qualifications have to earn
respect."
"Principals see superintendents as a reward for serving the
Ministry well. They think all superintendents should be
appointed from the ranks of principals."
"One has to win one's spurs and to demonstrate one can do
the task we ask of principals. When a superintendent has
little school or principal experience then naturally their
ability to question what a principal does will come under
scrutiny."
"Some superintendents have never been principals.
Principals feel those superintendents don't know what they
are doing."
"I fear I intruded on the mateship of primary principals,
their male bonding. If any of my principals go to my
director of operations with a management complaint I told
him I want to be present."
"Sexism? We are gradually overcoming that. Women
superintendents were regarded as 'boundary riders'
appointed only to work out in the sticks. "14
"The principals are improving. Some used to be rude. They
did not give me much leeway to sort out my role or give me
open invitations to address staff. It's hard for me to
work out if this is because of their antagonism toward
Central Office or because of stereotyped thinking about
females in authority."

-------------------------------------------------------Responses
14

"Legitimacy comes from doing the job. The red herring of sexism
should not be allowed to enter the debate."

I
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Another factor affecting principals' perceptions of superintendents'
expertise is networking.

Evidently, it can boost or block an individual's

legitimacy.
"One strategy to gain legitimacy is· networking;
gets around."

the word

"Having different groups causes problems because districts
get compared. Principals play one superintendent off
against another. They phone each other up. "111
Some superintendents considered that their credibility in schools
suffers because the position of superintendent has very little standing in
the eyes of certain principals.

One factor seen to be responsible here,

is antipathy towards anything associated with the new system.

Another

is, a view among some principals that if district offices were disbanded
it would take· months for schools to notice.

A third factor is the high

turnover rate in district offices, often as a result of superintendents
being seconded or taking leave:

for example, "I'm the fourth

superintendent in four years at the ( ..... ) district."

Furthermore:

"An added factor is the high turnover of principals in
country schools. It takes time to establish the bond between
district superintendent/principal roles.
"We have no clear direction from Central Office about how to
do merit promotion. I try to fit the normal curve but some
other superintendents are too generous. The system is
amateurish and that decreases our standing."
"As superintendents we face stress because of unclear
directions, inconsistency from Central Office, lack of
strategic planning skills at Central Office, and the
historical bloodbath of the Functional Review Committee - the
sacking of the superintendents showed a profound lack of
understanding."
"Until the industrial agreement, the school development
guidelines have no offical sanction by the teaching
fraternity."

-------------------------------------------------------Reapoases

111

"This is also a Central Office/district problem."
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Up till now, the legitimacy of some superintendents apparently has
depended as much on personal qualities as on professional expertise.

That

situation can leave them feeling vulnerable and at the mercy of the
principals' goodwill.
"How much I can influence depends on my personal
resources."
"Some superintendents maintain power by 'bonhomie'. They
establish a personal relationship with principals. Other
superintendents are hardliners, thick skinned, bombastic,
and give orders. Most superintendents however actively try
to get power through their endeavours, earning respect via
an ability to lead."
"We achieve a lot from goodwill generated from personal
relationships."
"I've had no problems with principals because I waited till
I got a good proflle. After three years in the district
I'm running performance management for the first time."
"The two fundamentals to a good relationship between
superintendents and principals are the school development
plan and an appropriate supervision or performance
management programme. Until these are in place the
'relationship relies on goodwill and personalities. How do
you give good non-threatening feedback in a situation where
there are no rules."
"Although most principals are individually courteous and
professional, the System reached an all-time low in some
displays of emotive rudeness at principals' and deputies'
conferences over the last two years. At the district level
too, a negative and pugnacious minority of principals can
dictate the quality of debate and cooperation. I even had
to phone one of my principals to confirm whether he had
been insulting to my secretary. He carefully explained he
meant the insult for my education officer. I asked him to
desist from insults. He did not apologise. A few weeks
later, another district office staff member expressed
surprise at how pleasant this principal had been to her. I
suspect this was not my discussion with him, but a little
resourcing power which the Central Office had dropped into
supers' laps that contributed to this change of attitude."

Closing comment

The material presented in this chapter suggests the amount of power
that superintendents have is determined by three factors:

their own
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personal qualities and professional expertise;
and political will of the system;

and the power of school principals.

also raises a range of questions such as:
superintendents need?

the regulations, policies,
It

How much power do

If superintendents are the agents of

accountability, do they have enough power to carry out that role
effectively?

ls the amount of power superintendents have determined by

their role or is their role determined by how much power they have?

Can

superintendents increase their power only at the expense of rrlncipals
losing some of theirs?
As has been the case throughout much of this chapter, the closing words
on these issues will be left to the superintendents.
perspectives.

There are two broad

One perspective is represented by comments which indicate

that superintendents feel they do not have enough authority, force, or
legitimacy.
"I tried to bring about a change in the management style of
a principal but in the end there was nothing I could do
about it."
"One old principal in my district has hated the Ministry
for 35 years. He has alienated the school community, has
no school development plans, and always wants me to solve
his problems. All I can do is stimulate him and keep his
interest"
"A key issue in our organisation ls that a manager at
superintendent level must have prescribed power and status
and a role which is educationally significant - one that
enables us to make a difference. We should be doing more
than swanning around using infiuence and being supporters
and facilitators. Just relying on influence is wimpish."
"I lack power in the secondary school situation because
there are no structures in place to do my job. Where does
the power come from?"
"I find audit threatening because if I find faults I have
to do something about it. Some superintendents lost power
and can no longer structure principals to do what
superintendents want them to and if they find fault then
they have no power to change it and therefore the
superintendent gets a black mark."
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The other perspective is represented by comments which indicate that
superintendents feel they do have enough power in relation to principals.
"One principal ruled that all pupils must wear uniforms
because he picked up from the shopping centre gossip that
uniforms set the tone. I got 20 calls a day from parents
complaining about it and discussed the matter with him. He
said, "Don't you trust me?" I said, "Yes, but it's not in
the regulations." I knew what his strategy was and he knew
my situation with the regulations. So we agreed to get
extra money to buy extra uniforms for children without
them. It took a while but we worked out an effective
strategy which lead to a good relationship. Some
principals expect superintendents to close ranks against
parents who complain."
"Fundamentally I don't want district superintendents to be
directional in a school, like some other superintendents
do. They want power for what? To influence the principal
to do what?"
"My philosophy has changed. Previously I'd say, 'That's no
good. Fix it.' Now I take more time and keep wearing
away. I use all the subtleties, not overt power.''
"Why should principals do what superintendents want them to
do? Isn't the scheme for schools to be self-determining
within Ministry guidelines?"
"Performance management is a legitimacy factor. I think
the principals perceive it as important and very
professional, relevant and fulfilling a need, and bringing
monitoring into the arena in a positive way and linking the
two tiers of the service in a trusting and collegial spirit
- we hope."
"We have influence, not power, and that makes schools more
self-determining. The leadership role for the
superintendent is to secure commitment, not compliance from
principals."

/
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CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUDING REMARKS

According to Stoner, Collins, and Yetton, management consists of four
processes:

planning, organising, leading, and controlling.

A recurring

theme throughout this report has been that in the management of the state
education system, the district superintendents' primary role is control.

In the final analysis, schools and the system do not need

superintendents for planning, organising, and leading.
things for themselves.
offer leadership.

They can do those

This is not to say that superintendents cannot

Clearly they can, but within a system of

self-determining schools it is a more limited type of leadership than was
the case with superintendents before 1987.

As one district superintendent

said:
"The superintendents are only leaders in the sense of being
a skilled courtroom lawyer. We have room for transactional
leadership because we shape principals' interpretations of
Ministry policy. There isn't much room for
transformational leadership. "1
It is the superinte-ndents' job to pursue the control process through to
its conclusion by taking corrective action if schools go down the wrong
track or do not go far enough down the right track.
to negotiate with schools to perform that function.

They should not have
Principals can

Responses

1

"But we can do this (transformational leadership) and have to
consciously work on it."
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rightfully refuse to accept assistance from superintendents when
developing and implemementing their school plans, but they can not refuse
to have those plans audited.

What they can legitimately expect is that

the monitoring be conducted fairly and constructively and that they are
not held responsible for factors outside their school's control.

To meet

those expectations, superintendents need time to collect sufficient·
information to validate claims about each school's performance.

They also

need time to establish non-threatening relationships with key members of
school communities.

In practical terms that probably means being

responsible for no more than fifteen schools - in other words, doubling
the size of the superintendency.
Some educational futurologists may question whether self-determining
schools will need superintendents in the long term, even for control.
Their vision includes a further radical restructuring in which the two
tier system is reduced to one tier, namely, publicly funded independent
schools.

The use of educational vouchers and 'opting out' along

Thatcherian lines provide mechanisms for pursuing that scenario.

Several

superintendents made comments intimating that for them the prospect of a
one tier system is not beyond the realms of possibility.
"District offices exist to help schools become
self-determining. Eventually we should become
redundant. "2
"Ultimately there ls no need for middle management.
Central Office could give a license to schools on the right
track."

-------------------------------------------------------Responses

"Having no district office doesn't mean a one tier system.
We still would have Central Office and schools" (a reference
group member).

2

"There is a need .to differentiate between district office and
superintendent."
/
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"Provided we produce quality principals and good curriculum
leadership sense, then I don't think we need any greater
assurances about student outcomes."
"We should train principals so they do their own
self-evaluation, their own school evaluation."
"If I do my job properly, I won't be needed in five years
time."

"I question whether we'll need district offices when
schools develop expertise and can buy expertise from
providers outside the Ministry."
Before going too far down the one tier path, it should be remembered
that in performing a quality control role, superintendents are not just
agents of excellence, they are also agents of equity.

Without effective

central regulation, some self-determining schools would become co-opted by
the forces of unbridled self-interest.

For example, in the wake of

deregulation and privatisation, the first step for some school communities
would be to declare themselves academically selective and cream off the
high achieving students without any thought or concern for the social
consequences of their actions.
It might seem that assigning superintendents predominantly to the area
of control devalues their role, given the negative stereotypes surrounding
the notion of 'control'.

The reality is quite different.

The type of

control which superintendents exercise is an integral part of a broader
challenge, namely:

to bring into balance the conditions for excellence,

enterprise and economic growth on the one hand, with the conditions for
equality of opportunity, participation and social worth on the other.
is difficult to think of a role more demanding, or more important.

It
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CHAPTER EIGHT

DISSENTING RESPONSES

In order to enable members of a wider group to participate in the
study, Chapters 1-7 were circulated as a draft report to thirty one
superintendents throughout the state, for comment.

Copies were also sent

to a small informal reference group outside the superintendency (see page
three).

Twenty seven superintendents replied within the four week period

allocated for this activity.
three interrelated ways:

Overall, their responses can be summed up in

none of the general points, themes or claims in

the draft report was challenged by a majority of superintenents;

all the

general points, themes and claims were supported by most superintendents;
in broad terms, the superintendents endorsed what was said in the draft
report.

This does not mean they agreed with every comment, or thought the

report covered all the important issues.

As the footnotes in previous

chapters indicate, different superintendents disagreed with different
particular statements.

This chapter presents other dissenting responses,

made by a minority of superintendents.

Chapter One:

Introduction

In introducing the study, Chapter One outlined why the role of district
superintendents is seen to lack definition and direction.

A number of

respondents considered the account to be either excessive or dated.
"When superintendents took up their appointment in 1988,
they knew the changed role in some detail."
"I always had a fair idea of what my role was and would
be. As it turned out I read the play - and as our role
becomes more fonnally stated it coincides with what I
;,, anticipated."

/
/
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"The role is increasingly becoming clarified - for example,
through the Demonstrating Accountability Project."
"The role is clearing significantly as a result of events
during the May-July period."
"The Agreement provides focus."

Chapter Two:

A Two Tier System

The central theme of Chapter Two was that the new structure set up in
1987 should be seen as consisting not of three tiers but of two - a
unified Central Office and schools.
a third tier.

That is, the district offices are not

The district superintendents are part of the unified

Central Office and the other staff in the district offices belong to the
schools.

Except for several respondents, that notion received widespread,

though often qualified, support.
One superintendent found difficulty with the view that the district
office was only a nominal entity housing representatives from the other
two tiers.

He said:

"I would agree that regulations, curriculum frameworks and
staffing decisions are largely, though not completely, Central
Office responsibility. However, I argue that districts,
through their boards of management can and must structure
goals, priorities and policies as an agreed district statement
to make the best possible use of resources and time in a
cooperative and consensual way. Unless this occurs through a
district board of management, what is the purpose of having
such a board?
From this rationale, I return to the point I made about
regulations, curriculum frameworks and staffing decisions not
being completely a Central Office responsibility. By this, I
mean that while Central Office can make statements of intent,
a board of management, representing schools, can respond to
those statements in such a way as to promote the need for and
even an alteration of any of the three elements. I guess what
I'm saying is that policy can be influenced, and this begs the
question of whether influencing a stated policy bears any
comparison with developing a policy. I happen to believe that
it does, while acknowledging that it is a point needing
careful consideration. For all that, I argue at this point
that superintendents can and do affect policy, both in its
formulation and its implementation, through their involvement
with boards of management charged with developing district
policy."
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The perspective outlined by this superintendent is consistent with the
'nesting' concept underlying the South Australian system.

In that state,

the "activities of the operational (area/regional) directorates are nested
within the framework provided by the Central Directorates above them.
Likewise, the operation of schools is nested within the structure provided
above them by the Area Directorates" (Education Review Unit 1989:8).
A number of questions arise from these perspectives.

Is it any more

appropriate for superintendents to be members of district management
boards than school councils (SBDMG's)?

Should an individual school's

adaptation of Ministry policies to the particular circumstances of its own
community be constrained by the collective interpretation of those polices
by all the schools in the district?

Does 'nesting' re-create the

blanketing effect which the regional offices under the previous system
exerted on the schools' progress towards self-determination and Central
Office's responsiveness to schools?
A second superintendent saw a need for some connecting unit between
Central Office and schools because "there is too long a line, particularly
in the case of remote schools."

She said that for a lot of principals who

are new or not strong, "the district office serves as a collection and
dissemination point, a security connection."

In her view,

"We won't be ready for a two tier system until schools
become more self determining, till schools have more power
- particuarly over their own staffing. Until we go down
that track a lot further, the two tier system won't work."
A third superintendent objected to parts of Chapter Two on the grounds
that, "You can't slap a two tier template across W.A. and expect to make
it work.

It works in the city with secondary schools but not in some

country schools."

He divided superintendents, and models, into purists

and pragmatists:
"In the purists' model of Better Schools, the notion of
self-determination is such that the superintendents have very
/

/'
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little power at all and no control over their staff; district
office staff are controlled by principals. With pragmatists
it is business as usual.
·
According to the purist model, district offices should not
have a culture, they should not be an impediment to the flow
of devolution from Central Office directly to schools. What
it forgets is that we are running a system of education in one
of the biggest states in one of the most centralized countries
in the world. District offices need to develop a culture that
schools can attach themselves to because of the geographical.
isolation and the schools' distrust of Central Office.
Pragmatists know better and have developed a district office
culture. I'm very tolerant of the impurity of the model. I
can happily live with the joint role of educational leadership
and audit and the fusion of district superintendent and
district office ............ ..
The models that came out of the Organisation Development
Unit are too pure for the system. For example, to say that
the district superintendent should not control district office
staff may well be possible in the metro area but not in my
country area. Also, the purist model is based on us having
100% highly competent principals. We haven't got that."
Several other responses suggest that some superintendents have mixed
feelings about the two tier system and might identify themselves as either
reluctant purists or reluctant pragmatists.
"The concept of separating the district superintendent from
the district office creates ambivalence within me. I do
not worry about this happening as long as I am left with
the resources to do my job - the supervision of schools."
"The last section ('A Clarifying Step') is good. But there
is no need for such a complete split. There is a
relationship between the district superintendent and the
district office which is different to that of the district
superintendent/school relationship. The district
superintendent needs to be able to closely interact with
the district office, especially in contributing a district
'global view', continuity, and leadership."
"I can identify with the superintendent who said, 'The best
moments come when I'm with my own district office staff' but not for the same reason. If we run as a two tier
system then being a superintendent is a lonely job - we
don't have a lot to do with the district office, the
district superintendent is not part of the team. At
present we get ongoing interaction working in a team
instead of being a lonely character on our own. Some of
the frustrations of the Job and the harsher comments on the
lack of consultation in this report come from not being
part of a team and being out on our own. I have a half way
step to separating the offices. While conceptually there
are two offices, the district office provides me with
executive support, so district office staff straddle both
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tiers. Superintendents in some cases have gone the
regional mode and created a third tier. I dichotomize the
district and the district office. The district has a
superintendent and some resources. It is not synonymous
with the district office. That's how I try to overcome a
misconception.'
Several superintendents emphasized that the three tier system of the
past only applied to primary schools.

Secondary schools, they said, were

left almost untouched by regional offices and therefore operated basically
under a two tier system consisting of schools and subject superintendents
based at Central Office.

That two tier system, however, differed markedly

from the one outlined in this report.

In several ways it undermined,

rather than promoted, the development of self-determining schools.

For

example, it allowed teachers to appeal to a subject superintendent for a
ruling that conflicted with what a school saw as representing its best
interests.

It also allowed teachers' professional identities and

loyalties to become bound more to their subject and superintendent than to
their schools and principal (Chadbourne and Quin 1990).
One superintendent was critical of the section headed 'Factors
Confounding a Two Tier System.'

In his view, the basis for confusion lay

not simply with structural influences, such as:

Central Office issuing

superintendents with a brief to get districts set up;

the Better Schools

Report explicitly outlining three levels - school, district, central;

and

the Ministry physically housing district superintendents and consultants
under the one roof.

An equally important source of confusion was the

construction that superintendents themselves actively placed on those
external constraints.

Thus, said the superintendent who made this point,

"I am arguing that the confounding factors were not so much
caused by the setting up of districts, but by the wishes and
interpretations of people involved in the role of the
superintendent of those districts, me included. Very simply,
the interpretations and alternative realities of people
involved would have done as much, if not more, to create the
confusion. Our current attempts to make sense of the present
in terms of the past must logically look at what was said, but
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we must also ask the question of how what was said was
interpreted, and for what reasons, vested or otherwise.
I don't find the latter point coming through in your work.
Sure, there are reasons to look 'out' at all the factors
creating the confusion. But in pointing out those factors,
and thus shifting responsibility to the facilitators and
implementers of the change, which up to a point is fair
enough, .there is also the need to look inwards and ask what
superintendents themselves did to create the confusion."
Three people questioned the commonly accepted view that superintendents
are, or should be, in response mode.

A reference group member said that

contrary to popular thought,
"Better Schools put the district superintendent in an active
quality control response mode - but people didn't know enough
about what that meant."
On a different tack, one superintendent made this observation regarding
his colleagues comments on page nine:
"These four comments imply that power is something that is
formally derived through money, status, authority. Thus 'we
are in response mode' must hold true. But doesn't this
overlook informal aspects of power? Surely 'we' can stlll be
proactive rather than simply reactive. Maybe these comments
are saying that now subordinates won't necessarily do what
subordinates say they should. Is that right? Food for
thought."
More descriptively, another superintendent commented:
"We are in 'response mode' is not entirely true.
district offices were quite proactive."

Chapter Three:

Some

The Centre Tier - Separating Operations From Policy

Chapter Three examined how the district superintendent's position in
Central Office has been affected by the separation of operations from
policy within the Ministry since 1987.

Nearly all the superintendents

agreed with the main findings, which were as follows:

the formal

structure largely excludes superintendents from the development of
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system-wide policy;
tokenism;

some consultation occurs but only at the level of

the limited scope for influencing policy makes superintendents

supervisors and custodians of change rather than architects and captains
of change;

and a desire exists among superintendents to play a greater

role in policy development.
In constrast to the high level of general agreement on those matters, a
few superintendents raised points of qualification and disputation.

One

superintendent claimed that he and the principals in his district did have
an opportunity to significantly restructure centrally formulated policy
that they decided "was not in the best interests of their schools."
Sometimes this meant slowing down "irrelevant or inadequately thought out
policy."

He also said that whilst superintendents contributed little to

state-wide policy at the formal level, informally there was considerable
scope for providing meaningful input.

For those reasons, he said,

"I always saw myself as being able to be involved in and to
' affect policy formulation ........ To explain, let's start
from the statement that 'the (.. my .. ) District is
different.' That is a fact. Whatever policy is set
centrally, it is always possible to make it look from
slightly to totally ridiculous relative to the ( ..... )
District, and for the whole time I was part of the district,
we (the principals and I) argued that if policy was to be set
centrally, it should be done in terms of setting a policy
that was applicable to the ( ..... ) District. From that
policy, the 'makers' could then 'work back' to see if that
policy fitted a city district. We argued that what happened
constantly was the reverse. An example was the First Steps
Programme - structured to apply to city districts, and had no
chance of being cost or resource effective in the ( ..... )
District.
We were saying that rather than set policy and then look at
its implementation, people should see implementation as the
umbrella under which policy must always be defined. If that
is accepted, then the district, in consultation with and
through its superintendent, must be involved in policy
formulation. Who knows the district better than the
superintendent who represents principals who represent the
school community ........ ..
I never relaxed from what became a vigil - contacting
people in Central Office to warn, disagree, argue, promote
and cajole about what was being planned for education
relative to the (. .... ) District. I found, most
interestingly, that people from the Executive Director to the
Health Education Consultant, listened, thought about what was
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put to them, and responded. I have to admit that the
responses were rarely ever exactly what I wanted them to be,
but I also claim, that most often, the original intentions
(including mine) were modified. Thinking retrospectively, I
trod on some toes, made a few enemies, and probably was seen
at times as pedantic and obstructive. However, certain
things did alter - not necessarily in the way that policy was
set, but certainly at times in the way policy was altered,
and certainly, frequently, the way that policy was to be
implemented .........
This then leads to another statement you make, that of the
notion of superintendents being supervisors and custodians of
change which they do not define. I find it to be
proble.matic. We are only supervisors and custodians if we
refuse to become involved in what schools and the district
are about and why. I argue that the role depends on how
superintendents seek to set, participate in, or influence
policy, and for what reasons. If it is to satisfy their own
need to see education functioning as they believe it should,
then devolution doesn't happen. change only happens according
to the wishes of the superordinate - communities and
principals get left out and we return to 'regionalization'.
If it is to help individual schools or groups of schools
achieve a policy which suits their needs, then devolution,
and thus policy making at school and district level, has some
chance of occurring.
I saw it as my role to participate in, to influence, and to
restructure if necessary, central policy formulation and
implementation where both the principals and I decided it was
not in the best interests of their schools. In those terms,
I think I was more than a supervisor and custodian of
change. In that sense I was a facilitator and a producer of
change at the local level for reasons which belonged to the
local level."
Another respondent felt that although superintendents had been largely
excluded from policy development in the past, several developments make
that situation unlikely to continue for much longer.
"The Memorandum of Agreement clearly indicates that the
policy issues it covers will have to be monitored. The
Organisation Development Unit has helped clarify the 'what'
aspects of monitoring. On Thursday, 14 June 1990, the 29
district superintendents met as a group to refine the 'what'
aspects, but more importantly develop the 'how' process
associated with monitoring. This was the first time that the
superintendents had met as a group. This input into policy
formation was appreciated.
Another factor indicating that perhaps the district
superintendent's role is in line for greater classification is
the recent changes in the structure of the Central Office.
The creation of a new division to be known as Schools
Operations, headed by an executive director, will, I believe,
give schools a more defined link with Central Office. I
envisage that superintendents will play a significant role in
linking schools and Central Office in this new structure.
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Input into policy formation may be part of this link. One of
the reasons given by the CEO for the structural changes is 'to
enable Central Office to be more responsive to schools as they
move towards self determination'.
The industrial events of 1989 also indicated to Central
Office that schools had to be listened to. The district
superintendents are the closest senior officers to schools.
Their knowledge about what is happening in schools will
become, I believe, increasingly important to policy makers.
Along with this, as the audit function of the district
superintendents is developed and put into place, a logical end
point in the process must be policy input. Audit processes
naturally, I believe, lead to change. If policy
implementation is consistently failing, as the Equal
Opportunity Commission suggests is the case with equity
issues, then change to either the policy or the implementation
process is necessary. District superintendents must be in the
the best position to signal what changes are needed."
Several respondents challenged the majority view that superintendents
should be centrally involved with state-wide policy formulation:
"My job is not to set policy for the state.
the overview, knowledge, or data."

I don't have

"How can you be a field-based person and actually write
-Ministry policy. Some superintendents think they are going
to drive policy. Their expectation of an involvement in
policy formulation is quite strange because we don't have
the time for that."
Finally, one superintendent expressed concern that Chapter Three
presented an unbalanced and negative account of the work of the directors
of operations.

He made the point that,

( ....... )
has been an outstanding director of operations as
far as I am concerned. He has been extremely supportive and
loyal to myself and to the principals and their schools in my
district. He has gone out of his way to foster my own
professional development as well as to enhance my role as a
superintendent. The principals in my district recognise
( ....... ) for his positive role and they are appreciative of
his efforts. 11
11

It should be acknowledged that during the initial round of interviews with
thirteen superintendents similar tributes were paid to the directors of
operations.

Most of these were not included in the draft report because

they fell outside the study's framework of analysis.

·.1

Chapter Three dealt
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with perceptions of the director of operations' role in relation to policy
development.

Had it focussed on the provision of professional support for

superintendents, more comments of the type quoted above could \1,e been
documented.

Chapter Four:

The School Tier - Differences That Cause Difficulties

Chapter Four focussed on the district superintendent's role in
supporting and monitoring the performance of schools and principals.

It

outlined five issues which affect the definition of that role, namely:
internal versus external review, school consultant versus system auditor,
professional development versus performance appraisal, principal
performance versus school performance, and secondary versus primary
schools.
The superintendents made little comment on this chapter.

To some

extent this is understandable given the clarification provided by the
recent Memorandum of Agreement and the draft guidelines on demonstrating
accountability being produced by the Organisation Development Unit.

Even

so, some mild dissent was registered. For example, one superintendent
said:
"Generally this was a chapter with which I have little
argument. I don't think there is as much conflict between
roles and duties as you often suggest. The majority of
district superintendents have excellent executive level
skills and they can be very good at wearing numerous hats."
None of the respondents indicated a preference for setting up external
review units along South Australian and New South Wales lines;
satisfied with the West Australian approach.

all seemed

Some superintendents,

though, intimated that by the end of the decade Western Australia should
be able to shed external monitoring and adopt the system of internal
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reviews exemplified in the Victorian model.

Also, the dichotomy between

support and appraisal raised some mixed comment:
"Organisations which separate policeman and supporter roles
don't work."
"Helper and judge opposed."

these two roles are diametrically

"The conflict situation associated with the 'consultant'
versus audit issue is real. The solution is to split the
functions so that each is dealt with by different personnel.
This also applies to the professional development versus
appraisal issue."
Of the five issues discussed in Chapter Four, the one which attracted most
comment was the difference between supervising primary and secondary
schools.

According to some superintendents, no significant difference

exists.
Finally, one superintendent raised the possibility that we might be
trying "to resolve conflict without seeking the value that it may offer in
terms of alternative solutions."

Instead of an issue-by-issue critique,

he made a general response to Chapter Four in these terms:
"You seem to have picked out the essential contradictions
very well. The criticial point to me, however, is not that
these contradictions should be sorted out but rather, how can
those contradictions be used to help us all work out what is
needed? The former process usually degenerates into an
'either-or' scenario, while the latter process has the virtue,
if managed properly, to throw up a whole lot of alternatives.
Contradictions are essential features of the process of
self-determination, as they facilitate and create alternative
solutions for differing circumstances and problems. Such a
position, I realize, ls open to challenge in terms of such
things as equity and equality, and of how we come to some form
of uniformity and ·a set of standards. I think a couple of
questions can be posed as starting points to discuss such a
challenge, such as firstly, if what we now have in terms of
equity and equality is a legacy of the previous system, then
why not try something different. Secondly, are we about
self-determination or are we about standardization; and when,
where and for whom?
The last question is a fundamental one. So, of course, is
whether we can be centralized and decentralized at the same
time, whether we can be idealistic and pragmatic
concomitantly, or resolve individual needs as we balance those
against system needs, or set in place flexibility, innovation
~md responsiveness as we seek effectiveness, efficiency and
accountability. All I can say is that answers to such
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contradictions are not found by setting in place 'the rules'
or 'the system' or 'the structure'. They are found by
grappling with each situation or contradiction relative to
person, time, place and circumstance."

Chapter Five:

Confiict Between the Tiers

Chapter Five began with the statement that ideally a system of
self-determining schools is characterised by unity within diversity.

It

went on to examine how the prospect of achieving that ideal was threatened
by conflict between Central office and schools, and how the role of the
superintendent, in turn, was affected by that conflict.

The analysis

attracted very little dissent.
One superintendent, though, asked, "What's the difference if I argue
that it is 'diversity within unity' - a set of boundaries within which to
operate?"

Diagrammatically, the difference between the two perspectives

can be represented as follows.

Unity in Diversity

/

Diversity ln Unity

l

A third possibility is 'unity within bounded diversity'.

A fourth is

'unity within broken bounded diversity' in which the boundary forms a
break to slow down rather than prohibit 'way out' non-conformity.
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One, in fact the only, sustained response to Chapter Five suggested
that conflict between the two tiers is better regarded as a phenomenon
than a problem:
· "Are you intimating that ideology played a hugely significant
role in what happened? I can see that historically, it is
possible to make a powerful and logical argument that the
need for two tiers was, on the one hand, to make the system
more flexible and creative, and on the other, to make it more
efficient and accountable. To do that, there needed to be
change. Change, of itself, brings confiict and in this
sense, I see the industrial division as no more than an
outcome of the process of change, and the ideological base as
the reason for the change. My framework is grossly
oversimplified and hierarchical; that the ideology of
certain people (including politicians) created the need, need
caused the change in structure (both system and curriculum),
and the industrial division was the means by which people
were able to make their feelings known about what had
happened. Sure, the work of a superintendent would be easier
if the divisions did not exist, but if they didn't we would
be inert and incapable of working towards self-determning
schools. Thus, let's see conflict as a positive process."

Chapter Six:

The Superintendent's Power in Relation to Principals

Chapter Six examined the nature and extent of the superintendent's
power in relation to principals - particularly with respect to the

99

management of change and the exercise of appropriate quality control in
schools.

Two types of power were identified:

force (formal authority

backed by sanctions) and legitimacy.
Most reviewers agreed with the analysis in Chapter Six but s~me said it
did not go far enough.

For example, one superintendent said he was still

left with the conceptual problem of finding the balance between promoting
self-determination, giving away power, and retaining accountability.
question he posed for himself was:

The

"How can anyone look to give people

responsibility and still state that ultimately the giver of responsibility
remains accountable?"

In more detail, he said:

"I seek legitimacy for my actions. I'm an idealist - I
only want power so long as I can give it away. But if I'm
going to give it away, then I must also give away
accountability, otherwise I will spend my life dominating
others so I can be accountable for whatever happens. There
are many who argue, and actually state to my face, that I
can't give power away because I can't give accountability
away. I admit to having trouble in doing it, not only
practically but conceptually, but it is something I need to
be able to do. It is what I am searching for, and is why I
said to you, and I've said to others, that in the best of
all possible worlds, if I do the role properly there should
be no role left for me. Unless I go on searching for that,
I can never see devolution working or any form of
self-determination taking place, because people will never
be able to be accountable, and thus responsible, for their
own actions. I will be the one accountable, and thus
responsible."
Another superintendent suggested that separating power into force and
legitimacy allowed other important distinctions to slip through the
sieve.

One of these was the difference between the contextual and

component variables associated with supervision.

In his experience,

principals considered the contextual variables more important than the
component ones;
than the job."

they say to him, "Who does your job is more important
Thus the amount of power a superintendent has depends

largely on "principals' perceptions of the authenticity and integrity of
the supervisor."
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In relation to the power and influence of district superintendents, a
reference group member said:
"I feel this issue of line management in education is
causing a lot of angst amongst district superintendents and
principals. There is confusion about just what 'being the
principal's boss' means. I reckon the key is to focus on ·
the difference between doing what you're told - and - being
accountable to someone for your performance. District
superintendents have swung on the pendulum of 'we can tell
them what to do' to 'we can only suggest/influence/guide.'
They haven't really explored the position, 'the principal
must demonstrate to me that the school is performing
satisfactorily.' Maybe this is not the place to tease it
out, I feel it is a theme which is going to be played out a
lot over the next couple of years."
He also offerred the observation that:
"Much of the focus for the district superintendent's role
has been on how it is a less powerful, more restriGted
leadership role. District superintendents have privately
wondered whether it is substantial enough to justify a
Level 8 status. I think more could be said about the
complexity and subtlety of the 'audit' role, the
challenging business of appraising a school, the higher
level management skills involved, etc. The demands that
these high level skills place upon superintendents are not
appreciated by most people."
Several superintendents emphasized that the need for power only becomes
an issue with principals who are opposed to the new structure.
principals there ls no problem.

With other

For example:

"Some 'merit promotion' principals are racing ahead of
teachers in implementing the Better Schools Report and I
have to put the reins on them. Other 'seniority
principals' are still trying to shut the gate on changes
rung out by the Better Schools Report four years after its
release."

Chapter Seven: Concluding Remarks

Chapter Seven concluded that the essential role of district
superintendents in a centrally supervised system of self-determining
schools is control, and in performing that role they are agents of equity
as well as excellence.

A few superintendents challenged aspects of that
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conclusion.
cop".

One said that the term 'control' sounded too much like "speed

Another objected to the term and concept of 'control' on the

grounds that "it is a bit foreign" and it does not sit easy with
"androgynous management".

Furthermore, said this superintende~t.

" 'Control' is the wrong frame for me. It's the frame of
the old inspectorial mode. It's too regulatory. It locks
us out of training and development and fails to convey the
sophistication and complexities of the nature of our work."
And for a third superintendent,
" 'Control' is the synonym for audit and hence the current
buzz word. Have we internalized it to such a prominent
extent as you express so succinctly?"
Two respondents suggested that the report could have done more to
develop and endorse the notion that superintendents are agents of equity.
Both commended the Equal Opportunity Commission Reports S.82 (b) as
documents with significant implications for the work of superintendents,
particularly with respect to monitoring the contestation of resources and
the implementation of central policies at the local level.

A Concern About the Report

Overall, most superintendents welcomed the report as a useful and
timely document for taking stock of the past and clarifying ideas for the
future.

Several, however, expressed concern that it was too negative.

One super!ntendent wondered where responsibility for the pessimism lay
with the interviewer or the interviewees.

He suggested that had a more

directive interviewing style been adopted, a more optimistic picture would
have emerged.

For example, superintendents could have been asked, "What

do you see for the future."

Or, "Do you see the future of tne

superintendency with pessimism or optimism and why?"

That would have

prevented them becoming pre-occupied with their dissatisfaction about the
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past.

Speaking for himself, he said that he was "pessimistic looking

backward - retrospectively, but optimistic looking forward prospectively."

On the other side of the ledger, said this

superintendent, because the non-directive interviewing style left the
agenda largely with the interviewees, they had an open opportunity to say
how they felt and in the event "conveyed pessimism and suspicion."
Another concerned superintendent accounted for the pessimism in terms
of two factors.

Firstly, he said that, apart from a meeting in January

1988 when a document was handed out about the superintendency,
"There has never been an inservicing on how a district office
should be run. So, each superintendent made his or her
interpretation depending on whether they were young or old and
city or country. Had we been brought together for two days
and taught how to run an effective district office then we
wouldn't see the negativism displayed in the report."
Secondly, he thought the views coming through the report were
predominantly those of 'old' (pre-1987) city superintendents who had to
deal with secondary schools.

So far as he could see, it was those

superintendents who faced most difficulty maintaining optimism, partly
because "secondary schools feel they can't get much out of district
offices and there are more of them in the city than in the country."
That theme was taken up by a superintendent who constructed a
three-dimensional matrix to depict his perceptions.

According to him, the

superintendents most likely to be less than optimistic were those
represented in the shaded section of the matrix below.
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In line with what proved to be a somewhat common theme, two other
superintendents made these observations:
"Many comments reflect a cynicism which could also show the
difference between the 'old' (i.e. pre 1987) and the 'new'
(first appointed in 1988) superintendents. The report does
not seem to take into account these different perspectives· i.e. one group who are critical and who feel frustrated and
disempowered by the changes and another group who have taken
up the challenge of the new order. Does the variation between
districts reflect these attitudes?"
"Of the thirteen superintendents you spoke to, the vast
majority must have been 'old' superintendents. The quotes in
Chapter Three are all from one point of view. If you had
spoken to a greater range of people you may have got another
side to the argument as well. When I read those quotes I got
an impression they came from people who had been
superintendents before."
Not surprisingly, some other superintendents took a different
perspective on these matters.

For example:

"There is no simple dichotomy. Superintendents are spread
along a continuum and some of the 'old' believe there are many
major improvements to the system under Better Schools."
"Some of the new superintendents are running districts like
the regions. The old superintendents know what not to do;
they are more in the new mould. The new superintendents are
modelling themselves on the old regional superintendents,
though some new superintendents have a good understanding of
the new system"
Of the thirteen superintende·nts initially interviewed, five were not
superintendents before 1987 - they were 'new'.

Judging from the

collective comments made during the interviews, it would be fair to say
that, as a group, the 'new' superintendents were no more or less
optimistic than the 'old' superintendents, as a group.
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Late Response

A number of respondents considered that this report, "does not speak
about the role, the theory of the role, or the variety of approaches to
the role of the district superintendent."

Instead, it focusses on "t.he

human dynamics in a very changing government organisation."

It deals with

"the uncertainties, confusions, and contradictions of our circumstances
sin'Ce 1988."

Though not necessarily a dissenting response, the following

letter from a district superintendent bears out those impressions to some
extent.

It is reproduced without analysis or comment because it arrived

late in the piece and there is a certain unity to it.
Rod, I have been a little tardy in getting these notes into some
kind of form, however for what they are worth, here they are.
My judgement is that we are heading in the direction of the two
tier system to which you allude. Initially, extreme difficulties
were experienced by all major players as the concept of
decentralising and recentralising simultaneously is quite novel to
those in the teaching force of Western Australia. It was clearly
not possible to explain to 25,000 just exactly what was encompassed
in this complex concept. In truth, there wasn't very much
explaining to anybody at all. Most of the awareness phase consisted
of Ministerial statements, newspaper articles and some public
addresses - a load which was carried by a very small group in
Central Office.
As Superintendents were not involved in framing the new
visions/directions involved for the education system, some did not
necessarily agree to this way of doing things. They didn't clearly
understand the major concepts and it seemed some didn't accept the
importance of the vision. My observations indicate that this
interferred with communication between Central Office and the school
face, because teachers quickly perceived a diffidence on the part of
some Superintendents to give confident, wholehearted commitment to
this new vision.
It is my observation that a similar scenario has developed between
principals and their school staff. It's probably reasonable to
observe that in some stances, official Ministry polices do now exist
on paper but they have yet to transfer into the hearts and minds of
the teaching population. Conversely, it might be argued that many
time worn and successful practices in schools continue to exist for
that very reason. These make a significant impact on the role that
Superintendents are obliged to take, but may well not be sanctioned
by official policy. An example is that schools desire to be
identified with the District Office because it has the
Superintendent who will be a leader and a decision maker, thus
removing this responsibility from teachers. There is also the
problem of principals gathering together to discuss and define
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district perceptions of Ministry policy and the tendency to look to
the Superintendent for decisions in this area, where in fact, Better
Schools policy is that Central Office policies take precedence districts do not create policy. If there is to be any variation of
Central Office policy, it is to be at school level and designed to
meet local needs that have been identified by analysis of data.
The role of the Superintendent has been clearly established in the
minds of teachers and principals over a period of some one hundred
years. These people exert pressure to maintain aspects of that role
they believe to be effective in the running of efficient schools:
As you rightly point out, some of them also exert pressure to
maintain aspects of that role that has advantages to them.
One quote on page 36 indicated that -Superintendents look to
Directors of Operations for goals a.nd leadership, as principals look
to Superintendents, regardless of the fact that leadership may not
be part of the future Superintendent's role; this applies to a
limited number of Superintendents. My view would be that the
Director of Operation's role is very diffuse, interpreted in at
least five quite different minds and defined by 29 diverse
Superintend en ts.
I believe a large number of Superintendents have formed their own
definition of the role. The fact that Superintendents are largely
concerned with control puts them, as pointed out by your report, in
the response mode and unless the Superintendent can operate very
adroitly, principals respond with the defence mode. This aspect of
the role is frequently perceived by the schools in a negative light
and removes a considerable amount of the job satisfaction available
to the Superintendent.
Prior to 1987, there was more scope for Superintendents to act as
an educational role model/leader. It is also pertinent to observe
that much of the power Superintendents ostensibly have in the
decision making area is often eroded when Central Officers revenie
decisions without giving a rationale and where it appears they have
not fully considered the various local factors that impinged upon
the Superintendent's decision. There are times when a great deal of
time and effort are expended by a Superintendent and there is no
evidence that Central Officers appreciate this contribution.
It is clear the role is an evolving one with many significant
changes still to come. It's my view that this report is an
interesting and useful beginning and much research still remains to
be done.
Best wishes
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